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Center for Urban and Regional Policy 
The Center for Urban and Regional Policy (CURP) was launched in 1999 at Northeastern University as a “think and do
tank”—a center where faculty, staff, and students from the university pool their expertise, resources, and commitment
to address a wide range of issues facing cities, towns, and suburbs with particular emphasis on the Greater Boston region.
It has produced an array of reports on housing, economic development, transportation, and workforce training; created
new computer-based information tools for researchers, students, and government agencies; and sponsored major “action”
projects, including the World Class Housing Collaborative devoted to assisting community groups develop housing in
their neighborhoods. CURP has also focused its attention on inner city development in older industrial cities in Massa-
chusetts. In 2000, CURP produced the New Paradigm for Housing in Greater Boston report, a comprehensive report detail-
ing the nature of the housing crisis in the region. CURP’s web site, www.curp.neu.edu, is a leading source of information
for community leaders, public officials, urban researchers, and students. CURP staff played a critical role in the creation
of Northeastern’s new School of Social Science, Urban Affairs, and Public Policy.
Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association
Citizens’ Housing and Planning Association (CHAPA) is a statewide organization that represents the interests of all play-
ers in the housing and community development fields, including non-profit and for-profit developers, municipal officials,
homeowners, tenants, bankers, real estate professionals, property managers, and government officials. The organization
is a sponsor of many research projects concerned with housing and in 1998 commissioned a study from the Donahue
Institute at the University of Massachusetts entitled “A Profile of Housing in Massachusetts.” This report began the work
of measuring progress in key housing policy areas such as supply, affordability, and accessibility. Over the past five years,
CHAPA has assisted in the funding and development of each of the Greater Boston Housing Report Cards.
The Boston Foundation 
The Boston Foundation, Greater Boston’s community foundation, is one of the oldest and largest community founda-
tions in the nation, with assets of close to $890 million. In 2007, the Foundation and its donors made more than $90
million in grants to nonprofit organizations and received gifts of more than $90 million. The Foundation is made up
of some 850 separate charitable funds established by donors either for the general benefit of the community or for
special purposes. The Boston Foundation also serves as a major civic leader, provider of information, convener, and
sponsor of special initiatives designed to address the community’s and region’s most pressing challenges. For more
information about the Boston Foundation, visit www.tbf.org or call 617-338-1700.
UNDERSTANDING BOSTON is a series of forums, educational events and research sponsored by the Boston Foundation to
provide information and insight into issues affecting Boston, its neighborhoods, and the region. By working in
collaboration with a wide variety of partners, the Boston Foundation provides opportunities for people to come together
to explore challenges facing our constantly changing community and to develop an informed civic agenda.
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The 2006-2007 Greater Boston Housing Report Card 
is the fifth such collaboration between Northeastern
University’s Center for Urban and Regional Policy
(CURP), the Boston Foundation, and Citizens’ Hous-
ing and Planning Association (CHAPA). Each year
since its introduction in 2002, the Report Card has
examined economic trends and market conditions 
that affect current and projected housing needs in 161
cities and towns including and surrounding Boston.
Data from a variety of public and private sources are
analyzed to assess the adequacy of the region’s hous-
ing production and to measure progress in making
housing more affordable through new production, 
the preservation of existing stock, and government
support for housing. 
This year’s report continues this tradition at a time
when housing and its impact on the economy has
garnered national attention as a result of the collapse in
the subprime lending market, rising foreclosure rates,
and growing anxiety about housing values. At the
same time housing affordability remains a continuing
concern in high cost regions like Greater Boston.
Indeed, Greater Boston is facing a housing conundrum:
homeowners and landlords are concerned about possi-
ble depreciation in the value of their properties yet at
the same time the level of affordability has improved
only marginally after a long run-up in prices and rents.
The challenge is how to protect against a collapse in
housing values while at the same time assuring suffi-
cient new housing supply to provide more affordable
options for low-income households and for young
workers and their families who are just beginning to
think about homeownership in Greater Boston.
Background
Housing production goals for the region were origi-
nally established in a 2000 CURP report commissioned
by the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Boston and the
Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce. That report, 
A New Paradigm for Housing in Greater Boston, warned
that the region’s high housing costs and inadequate
inventory were threatening its economic competitive-
ness. The authors appealed for an ambitious social
compact to increase the supply of housing, calling it
both a moral imperative and an economic necessity.
The New Paradigm report estimated that 15,660 units of
housing were needed annually in the 127 municipalities
that comprised the Boston metropolitan area to meet
housing needs and moderate the escalation in rents
and home prices. Existing production was generating
only about 8,500 units a year, of which an estimated
1,300 were designated for occupancy by low or moder-
ate income households. That left a shortfall of some
7,200 units per year. The equivalent number of units
required for the 161 communities tracked in the origi-
nal Housing Report Card was estimated to be 18,000
units. With actual production at just over 10,000 units,
the shortfall in these communities was roughly 8,000
per year. 
In 2005 CURP re-evaluated its estimate of how 
much new housing was needed in light of the region’s
increased production, sluggish economic performance,
and faltering demand, but concluded that Greater
Boston still needed to increase production of housing
that would be attractive, affordable, and accessible to
a growing workforce. Much of the recent increased
production, it noted, had been targeted to households
at the highest levels of income and/or those over the
age of 55. Drawing a parallel to Boston’s recovery from
the last recession, which began slowly but accelerated
rapidly, CURP reaffirmed its estimate that a total of
18,000 units per year were needed in the 161 cities 
and towns it covers. 
Since that time, employment growth in Greater 
Boston has continued to be sluggish and the region’s
population has not grown at all. If this trend continues,
demand for new housing may subside and the shortfall
in housing will be less than originally forecast in 2000
and again in 2005. But accurate forecasting of popula-
tion and employment trends in the current environ-
ment is all but impossible given the many economic
and political uncertainties that will shape the outcome.
What we do know from a growing body of research is
Preface
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that a lack of housing leading to higher prices can
stymie economic growth and limit the ability of a
region to retain or attract young working families.
What we also know with certainty is that preparing 
for a variety of possible employment and population
outcomes for the region is critical and that it involves,
at a minimum, three components: 
1. A zoning and regulatory framework that allows 
for adequate new production so that the region’s
housing supply can be increased in a timely and
predictable manner if demand warrants, mitigating
the region’s age old problem of long delays in
getting housing built when demand increases;
2. An adequate supply of housing for a cross section 
of ages and incomes, with particular emphasis on
homes that will be attractive to young working
families, a group that is critical to the Common-
wealth’s economic prosperity; and
3. Sufficient funding to ensure that low-income house-
holds can find permanent housing that is safe and
affordable. 
Purpose
The purpose of this Report Card is not to advocate for
particular housing policies, but to provide an objective
measure of the region’s progress toward meeting its
housing needs. It does so by performing the following
tasks:
■ Assessing economic trends and market conditions
that affect current and projected housing needs
■ Collecting, consolidating, and reporting housing data
from various public and private sources that can be
used to assess the adequacy of production levels
■ Improving the accessibility and utility of informa-
tion so that policymakers, housing advocates,
community leaders, realtors, housing developers,
and others can evaluate performance; and
■ Measuring progress in key areas of housing devel-
opment, including production of new housing and
rehabilitation of the existing stock, housing afford-
ability, and government support for housing.
By identifying trends early on and clarifying their
impact, the authors and sponsors hope that the 
Housing Report Card can galvanize private and 
public support for meeting the housing challenges
faced by the Greater Boston region.
A Note on Geographic Definitions and Data Sources 
Some data are available at the municipality level for
each of the 161 cities and towns tracked by the Housing
Report Card, but most demographic and economic 
data – particularly in the years between the decennial
censuses – are reported only for larger geographic 
areas such as a state, county, or metropolitan area.
Often, metropolitan area boundaries are modified in
the years following a decennial census to reflect shifts
in population and commuting patterns. As a result of
the most recent changes, the data reported in the U.S.
Census Bureau’s 2005 American Community Survey
(ACS) for the Boston metro area as a whole are not
directly comparable to the 2002-2004 ACS data, which
had been reported in earlier versions of the Housing
Report Card. To preserve the ability to monitor trends
over time for the region as a whole, this year’s report 
presents demographic data for Essex, Middlesex,
Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk Counties. These five
counties encompass 147 municipalities, which we now
refer to as the Greater Boston region. The original 161
cities and towns had a 2000 population of 4,206,809;
these 147 have a population of 4,001,752, or 95 percent
of the population of the original communities. In
reporting progress on a town-by-town basis, however,
we have continued to include the original 161 munici-
palities. (See the map on the inside of the back cover 
of the report.)
For More Information 
Some topics that were explored in depth in previous
Report Cards are referenced here, but not discussed 
in detail. The Housing Report Card was designed as a
series, and in the interest of efficiency and readability,
we try not to repeat our discussion of topics and trends
that do not change significantly from year to year.
Readers can find additional information on historic
trends in state and federal support for low-income
housing in the 2002 report; comparative information
on the cost of living in the nation’s major metropolitan
areas is included in the 2004 report; and an expanded
discussion of the link between housing costs, employ-
ment, and population is provided in the 2005-2006
report. All of the Housing Report Cards, including 
this current one, are available at www.curp.neu.edu.,
www.tbf.org, and www.chapa.org.
Executive Summary
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From 1995-2005, soaring home prices provided home-
owners in Greater Boston with a rapidly appreciating
asset and developers with a good reason to increase
housing supply. However, that new housing supply
never materialized, due—in large part—to restrictive
local zoning and land use controls and protracted
permitting processes. For this reason, home prices
soared and rents rose rapidly for an entire decade
(1995-2005), making housing less and less affordable 
to more and more households. This prompted many
young working families to leave the region, dissuaded
others from coming here, and discouraged business
investment in the region. The extraordinarily high 
cost of housing helped stymie employment growth
and economic development more generally. While 
the national economy recovered quickly from the
2000-2001 recession, regional employment increased 
so slowly that even today—six years later—Massa-
chusetts has over 100,000 fewer jobs than it did 
before the recession began.
The current situation is not advantageous to anyone—
homeowners, developers, potential homebuyers, or
renters. Home prices have declined just enough to
create anxiety among current homeowners. The soft-
ness in the housing market has provided only minimal
relief to those who would like to buy a home here and
no relief whatsoever to low and moderate income
renters. Following the 160 percent increase in home
prices between 1995 and 2005, the median house price
in the region is now $371,000, just 6 percent below its
2005 peak. And after declining modestly between 2001
and 2004, area rents have stabilized and, in a number
of submarkets, increased over the past two years. 
The combination of high housing costs and stagnating
household income means that affordability remains 
a serious problem for many homeowners and renters
despite the softening housing market. As of 2006,
nearly 40 percent of homeowners with mortgages 
were paying more than 30 percent of their gross
income for housing, up from just 27 percent in 2000.
More than half of renters in 2005 were paying more
than 30 percent of their income in rent, up from 39
percent in 2000. Indeed, a quarter of renters, and one
out of seven homeowners, were paying half or more
of their income to cover their housing costs.
This poses a challenging housing conundrum: how 
do we begin to make housing more affordable over 
the long term, at a time when falling housing prices 
are creating increasing anxiety among homeowners
and discouraging developers from increasing housing
supply. Moreover, how do we ensure that new devel-
opment, once demand recovers, is harmonious with 
its surroundings, sustainable, and enhances the well
being of existing and future residents. 
Key Findings 
Economic and Demographic Trends
in the Greater Boston Region
Employment Begins to Recover, Slowly
For the first time in five years, the Commonwealth 
is witnessing economic activity comparable to the
national average—but mostly because growth in the
national economy has been slowing since early in 2006.
Massachusetts added 35,000 new jobs (1.1 percent) in
2006, slightly below the national rate, while in the first
half of 2007 it added 29,200 jobs, growing somewhat
more rapidly than the nation. Still, Massachusetts
employs 102,000 fewer people today than it did in
February 2001, the peak before the latest recession.
The pace of employment growth in Massachusetts is
such that the state will not get back to the employment
levels that existed before the 2000-2001 recession until
2011. What is more troubling, this weakness is largely
the result of a lackluster performance in the very
industries that we have believed to be the key sectors
for our future prosperity: computer services, health
care, and education. 
Employment growth in the Boston metro area followed
a pattern similar to the state’s: 27,300 new jobs were
created in 2006, representing a rate of growth of 1.1
6 U n d e r s t a n d i n g  B o s t o n
percent, and another 17,100 were added in the first six
months of 2007. The gap in the employment growth
rate between the Boston metro area and the U.S. has
narrowed since 2002, but jobs are still being created
faster nationwide than here.
Interest Rates, Housing Prices, and Rents
Declining mortgage interest rates—from 8.21 percent
in January 2000 to a 40-year low of 5.23 percent in the
summer of 2003—encouraged millions of households
nationwide to become homeowners, including many 
in Greater Boston. As a result, the short-term demand 
for housing increased sharply. In much of the country
this increased demand was accompanied by a rise in 
housing starts, but in Massachusetts there was no
corresponding increase in the supply of single family
homes. Barriers to new construction in many Com-
monwealth communities precluded developers 
from building housing fast enough to meet the 
new demand, even as housing prices soared.
Late in 2005 interest rates began to creep up, reaching 
6 percent by the end of the year, and averaging 6.4
percent in 2006. The same monthly payment that
enabled a homebuyer to obtain a $300,000 mortgage 
at 5.7 percent in June 2005 would only cover a $270,000
mortgage at June 2007’s 6.7 percent rate. With interest
rates climbing, the economic outlook uncertain, and
consumer confidence faltering, demand for new hous-
ing slowed. According to the Office of Federal Housing
Enterprise Oversight, Massachusetts experienced nega-
tive appreciation—falling prices—for the year ending
March 2007, a distinction shared by only one other
state, Michigan.
Population, Income Trends, and Migration
After experiencing back-to-back years of population
decline, Massachusetts registered an incremental
(1/10 of 1 percent) increase in population between July
2005 and June 2006, and the state’s population is now
2.2 percent higher than it was at the time of the 2000
Census. The 161 cities and towns covered by the 
Housing Report Card had fared even worse, recording
population losses for three consecutive years. This
trend, too, was reversed between 2005-2006, also with
a 1/10 of 1 percent increase. It is important to note,
however, that it is foreign immigration that continues
to offset domestic outmigration. 
Although Massachusetts households enjoy one of the
highest average incomes in the nation, income growth
has stagnated here, and is likely to grow more slowly
than the rest of the nation in 2008. So even with 
housing prices slipping, affordability for existing
and would-be homeowners and renters continues 
to pose a serious threat to the region’s prosperity.
At the beginning of the present decade, Massachu-
setts was experiencing an annual domestic net
out-migration of about 23,000 residents. Since 2003, 
the net outflow of residents has ranged between 50,000
and 62,000 per year, and the largest loss of population
has been in the 20-24 and 25-34 year old cohorts. 
Housing affordability is a key factor in the growing
rate of out-migration from the Commonwealth.
Production of New Housing
Housing Starts Drop Locally and Nationally
After three years of double-digit increases, the number
of new housing units permitted in Greater Boston
dropped by nearly 12 percent in 2006. Single family
production experienced the most acute drop, falling 
by more than 25 percent. Multifamily production fell
by just over 2 percent. This performance mirrored
the national trend, which saw permits overall fall by
almost 15 percent with single family permitting down
by 18 percent and multifamily by 1.3 percent. 
At the current rate of permitting, an even sharper drop
in new housing permits is projected for 2007. Nation-
ally, overall permitting during the first six months of
the year was down by nearly 26 percent compared to
the same period in 2006, and analysts are estimating
that 2007 will be the worst year for housing starts in
more than a decade. Single family permitting was off
by nearly 29 percent and multifamily by 14 percent. 
In Massachusetts, permitting is likely to drop to a 
level not seen since 1991. Through June, single family
permitting in Greater Boston was down by 25 percent
and multifamily by 26 percent. On an annual basis, this
will put the number of single family homes permitted
at its lowest level in at least 28 years.
Housing Production by Location
Since 2000, one third of the region’s new housing
production has occurred in just nine cities and four
towns out of the 161 Greater Boston communities.
Municipalities that led the region in permitting new
housing in 2006 achieved their numbers by approving
large multifamily developments. Most also included
affordable units in the mix, either because the new
developments were permitted under 40B—and thus
required a low income set aside—or because the
municipality had an inclusionary zoning requirement.
Danvers, North Andover, Billerica, and Newton are
examples of the former; Boston, Cambridge, and
Watertown are examples of the latter. Major 2006
developments in Quincy, Hingham, and Plymouth 
are age restricted to senior citizens.
As has been the case for several years, luxury condo-
miniums and apartments in the hub of the region,
suburban development permitted under Chapter 40B,
age-restricted housing, and a scattering of single family
homes built at medium and low densities in the outer
suburban ring or on infill lots in mature suburbs,
comprised the bulk of the 2006 new production.
Disproportionately these new homes are targeted 
to the high end of the market and/or to those aged
55 or over.
Type of Housing Produced
Many of the 40B developments include moderately
priced single family homes—in their market rate
component as well as the “affordable” units reserved
for low and moderate income households—but most 
of the other non-age restricted single family production
is geared to the trade-up market, and priced accord-
ingly. The production of other entry-level homes for
young families is practically non-existent in the close-
in suburbs. The prices of new single family homes
drop the further one moves from Boston, but even in
Worcester and Bristol Counties and New Hampshire’s
Rockingham and Strafford Counties, single family
production was down in 2006. 
The 2006 multifamily production, while down slightly
from 2005, was the second best performance in two
decades. The softness in the condominium market did
result in some projects being put on hold and several
condominium properties that were completed in 2006
are being marketed, at least in the short term, as rentals.
Much of the new multifamily production, both rental
and homeownership, is concentrated in Smart Growth
locations, including formerly vacant or underutilized
land and buildings in Boston and other inner core cities,
surplus state properties in suburban locations, and sites
adjacent to transit stations and commuter corridors.
Student housing, a major contributor to housing capac-
ity in a region with as many colleges and universities
as Boston, has risen in the past few years. In 2006 and
the first quarter of 2007, construction began on more
than 3,200 student units, the equivalent of approxi-
mately 812 new apartments.
Septic Systems, Lot Sizes, and Housing Prices
Greater Boston’s reliance on private septic systems and
wells accounts for much of the difficulty in construct-
ing affordable single family housing. These systems 
are land-intensive, requiring large lot sizes that tend 
to preclude the construction of lower-priced units.
Forty-two of the towns in Greater Boston have no
public sewer system at all; another 17 have sewer
systems that serve fewer than 25 percent of the homes
in the community. Among more than 45 major metro
areas, only Providence, Rhode Island and Birmingham,
Alabama have a greater reliance on septic systems.
Rents, Home Prices, and Affordability
Greater Boston’s Rental Market
Rental vacancies in the Boston metropolitan area in
2006 were in the normal range of 5-6 percent. The U.S.
Census Bureau estimated the average annual vacancy
rate at 5.3 percent and Reis, Inc., the principal source
used by the Report Card to track historic rent and
vacancy trends, pegged it at 5.03 percent. Both sources
report that the vacancy rate has remained in that range
through the first half of 2007.
Despite vacancy rates in the normal range and an
increase in rental production, the asking price index for
rental units rose 4.1 percent in 2006 to $1,644. Effective
rents—the cost to the tenant after taking into account
price concessions, etc.—rose by 4.5 percent to $1,565,
according to Reis, Inc. This rise in rents is likely due, in
part, to an increase in the renter population in 2005—the
first since 2000—adding to demand for rental housing.
While the strength of the rental market varies by
neighborhood and municipality, the general decline 
in rents experienced between 2001-2004 appears to 
be a thing of the past. Rents have stabilized and, in a
number of sub-markets, are on the rise again. With rent
levels among the highest in the nation, and vacancies
within the normal range, it is unlikely that rents will
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Greater Boston and the National Context
The real estate industry had predicted that home prices
would stabilize by the end of 2006 and would begin 
to climb thereafter, but many analysts now expect the
weakness in the market to continue into 2008 as excess
inventories get absorbed. Reducing the overhang will
be complicated if foreclosure sales bring added inven-
tory to the market, if lenders tighten credit standards
because of concerns about rising mortgage default
rates, or if mortgage interest rates rise. 
Unlike parts of the country that experienced unbridled
overbuilding, Greater Boston does not have a substan-
tial unsold inventory of newly built homes but it is
witnessing a standoff between anxious would-be
buyers, who think the market may drop further, and
would-be sellers with inflated expectations of their
property’s value. New construction constitutes only
about 10 percent of the home sales in any given year in
Massachusetts, compared to 13-15 percent nationally.
Still, the current slowdown is affecting the state’s
homebuilders. Much of the recent production has 
been targeted to empty nesters, and in many cases,
restricted to households with at least one member 
over age 55. Units in this market segment cannot move
unless potential buyers can sell their existing homes. 
After appreciating at a faster rate than the national
average between 1995 and 2002, housing prices in
Massachusetts have trailed the national rate in the
years since, appreciating by 44 percent, compared 
to the national rate of 54 percent.
Home Ownership Affordability
That Boston was the 3rd most expensive home buying
market in the nation in 2001, and now ranks #15, is
scant comfort to those who wish to purchase a home
here. Affordability did improve modestly in 2006 as
falling prices more than offset rising interest rates, 
but future interest rate increases could easily reverse
these gains.
The number of communities where the median single
family home would be affordable to a family earning
the median household income of that community
increased in 2006 and again through the first five
months of 2007, to 30 and 46, respectively, after
having dropped from 148 in 1998 to just 19 in 2005.
Still, housing is not affordable by this measure in
nearly three-quarters of Greater Boston communities.
drop substantially from their current high levels, and
a pressing shortfall exists for low-income renters. 
Rental Affordability
The number of renter households paying more than 
30 percent of their income for rent rose by nearly 
9 percent between 2004 and 2005, and the number
paying in excess of 50 percent jumped by 36 percent,
affirming the anecdotal evidence that many of the
region’s renters are worse off today than they had been
at the market’s peak. Since most cost burdened tenants
are those with the lowest incomes, they are left with
little for other basic necessities like food, health care
and childcare.
In its most recent annual assessment of least affordable
rental markets, Out of Reach 2006, the National Low
Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC) ranked Massachu-
setts 3rd, after Hawaii and California. The Common-
wealth has held one of the top four positions since 2000.
The Boston-Cambridge-Quincy metro area ranked 6th.
(It has ranked between 5th and 7th since 2000.)
Home Sales and Prices
On the homeownership side, home sales in Massa-
chusetts declined sharply in 2006, and they are down
again through the first half of 2007. The state has now
experienced declining sales in seven of the past eight
quarters. Home prices, too, have fallen in each of the
last six quarters statewide, most recently dropping 
by 1.4 percent in the second quarter of 2007. 
In the Greater Boston region, the number of single
family home sales in 2006 fell 15 percent from 2005
levels with the median price down 4.3 percent. Single
family sales continued to slide during the first six
months of 2007, falling another 6.3 percent. The
median price dropped by 2 percent to $371,000, 
6 percent below its 2005 peak.
The median price of single family homes sold in
2006 fell in 130 out of the 161 communities (about 81
percent) tracked in this report, and a similar pattern
has emerged through the first half of 2007. This across-
the-board price drop is a reversal of the trend in previ-
ous years, when prices increased year-over-year in
more than 90 percent of the region’s municipalities. 
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Affordability for first-time homebuyers also increased
in 2006 and 2007, but that means that now just six
communities out of 161 are now affordable to these
households, up from zero.
The Rise of Subprime Lending in Greater Boston
The subprime lending story is a national one, and 
the growing problems in the industry are sending
tremors throughout the economy. Between 2001 and
2006, the rate of subprime lending in Massachusetts
increased by nearly 700 percent. By contrast, the rate
of prime lending increased by just 28 percent during
the same period. 
In the City of Boston, home loans to white and Asian
borrowers dropped in 2005 (the most recent year for
which data are available), while loans to Black and
Latino homebuyers rose sharply, with almost all of the
increase coming by way of subprime loans. Subprime
loans account for a disproportionate share of the loans
made in low-income minority neighborhoods in Boston.
Overall, subprime lenders accounted for 16.2 percent
of total home-purchase loans in the 101 Greater Boston
cities and towns for which such data are available, but
more than one-third of all loans in Everett, Revere,
Chelsea, Randolph, Lynn, and in certain Boston neigh-
borhoods, all communities with substantial percent-
ages of black and/or Latino households and with
relatively low median family incomes. Because of
the increasingly high levels of default associated with
subprime mortgages, this clustering is worrisome.
The Growing Risk of Subprime Foreclosures 
According to the most recent quarterly delinquency
survey by the national Mortgage Bankers Association,
one subprime borrower in seven in Massachusetts is 
at least 30 days past due on mortgage payments. More
than 6.5 percent are in the process of being foreclosed,
and many more are likely to follow suit when their
adjustable rate mortgages are reset and/or low intro-
ductory rates expire. This is in marked contrast to the
situation reported just a year and a half ago. At that
time, Massachusetts mortgage delinquencies and 
foreclosures, while rising, were well below the national
average. 
The full impact of the subprime lending problems on
the national and local economies is not yet known, but
the effect on individual homeowners, their tenants (if
the property was a two- or three-family home), and
communities with high concentrations of these loans
could be devastating. 
Production of New Affordable Housing
Overview
There were 2,422 new affordable housing units
produced in 2006, 3.4 percent fewer than in 2005 and
the first year-over-year drop since the Housing Report
Card began tracking in 1999. Still, the 2006 affordable
production was the second highest in at least a decade
and represents a tripling of the production levels
achieved in 1999 and 2000.
More than 40 percent of the region’s communities
permitted at least some affordable housing in 2006, the
same as in 2005, and double the number that did so in
2000. The comprehensive permit (Chapter 40B) was
used by nearly three-quarters (50) of these. Thirteen
communities gained units through inclusionary or
incentive zoning, or negotiation, and nine employed
traditional subsidies. 
Creating Affordable Housing in a Declining Market
While the number of new affordable units in 2006
dropped only slightly from 2005, there were important
shifts in how these projects were being undertaken,
associated with the overall softening of the real estate
market. Massachusetts had become increasingly
dependent on 40B to sustain its affordable housing
production in recent years. Between 2002 and 2005,
40Bs accounted for 73 percent of the new affordable
units built outside the City of Boston. In 2006, as overall
production dropped, so did new development under
40B. While the comprehensive permit continued to
play a dominant role in new affordable production 
in 2006, it was utilized in just 48 percent of the units
outside the City of Boston. 
Affordable Housing Leaders and Production Tools
In 2006 the traditional low-income housing developers,
using a variety of tools and programs such as federal
and state grants and tax credits, represented the largest
share of the region’s affordable housing production. 
In addition to the housing created using traditional
subsidies and 40B, new affordable units were
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constructed in 2006 by developers of market rate hous-
ing who agreed to set aside affordable units in market
rate developments under inclusionary mandates and 
a modest number of units produced by nonprofit
organizations like Habitat for Humanity that do not
rely on government funding. The 2006 inclusionary
units were almost entirely attributable to developments
in Boston and Cambridge, and the redevelopment of 
a surplus state property in Lexington. Also in 2006,
construction began on the first new affordable units in
40R Smart Growth development districts, in Chelsea
and Haverhill.
More than a quarter of the 2006 affordable housing
production in the region—630 units—was constructed
in the City of Boston. Other 2006 affordable housing
leaders include Cambridge, Quincy, Lexington,
Dedham, Peabody, Haverhill, and Chelsea. Currently
DHCD credits 31 Greater Boston municipalities with
having at least 10 percent of their housing affordable,
with six having achieved that milestone since last
year’s Housing Report Card.
Preserving Existing Affordable Housing
Greater Boston’s record on preserving its existing
public and subsidized inventory was mixed in 2006-
2007. Some 300 low-income units that had been built,
or substantially rehabilitated, under federal or state
subsidy programs between 1965 and 1985 were
preserved. However, Boston, Brookline, Somerville,
Lawrence, Braintree, and Andover all lost units as
similar developments were removed from the subsi-
dized inventory when their owners opted out of the
programs that had restricted occupancy to low-income
tenants. (The low-income tenants are rarely evicted
when properties convert to market rate develop-
ment—they are protected with rent subsidies for as
long as they remain in their homes—but once they
leave, that unit is no longer protected.) 
Housing professionals had long contended that the
state-funded public housing inventory was under-
funded, and in 2006 the Boston, Brookline, and
Cambridge Housing Authorities filed suit in Suffolk
Superior Court to compel the Commonwealth to meet
its obligations to support the operation and mainte-
nance of its public housing units. The plaintiffs sought
to obtain funds that had been authorized but not
distributed, and also to secure sufficient and
predictable funding in the future. When the newly
elected Governor and his leadership team released
millions of dollars owed to these three housing 
authorities and others, and pledged to improve 
conditions and funding, the suit was dropped.
Public Spending on Housing and 
Support for Housing
The federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD) spends some $2 billion annually 
in Massachusetts, but only a small portion of this is
funding that flows through the state’s Department 
of Housing and Community Development (DHCD). 
Most of the $400 million in federal funds that does
flow through DHCD goes to honor existing commit-
ments to provide rent subsidies or home heating 
assistance, not new production.
In FY2007, the total spending over which DHCD had
oversight included $391 million from federal sources
and $258 million directly from the state. In addition,
the state’s quasi-public agencies, MassDevelopment
and MassHousing, provided nearly $400 million in
financing to support low- and moderate- income hous-
ing development and preservation in Massachusetts.
State Funding Up, Federal Funding Down
Federal support for affordable housing was down 
by seven percent from 2006, a drop of nearly $29
million. Funding for the HOME Program and the
Community Development Block Grant Small Cities
Program fell by $5 million and $13.6 million respec-
tively, and funding was down in a number of home
heating and weatherization accounts.
State spending on Housing and Community Develop-
ment (DHCD) programs has increased each year since
2004, when it reached a nine-year low of $188 million.
In 2008, the budget for DHCD programs will be $199
million. This represents the highest level of support
from the state since 1991. In inflation adjusted dollars,
however, the current spending level is 23 percent less
than it was in 1991, and only half the $410 million
committed in 1989. 
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Other State Support for Housing
In its first six months in office, the Patrick administra-
tion achieved some important milestones on the hous-
ing front. These include reorganization of the state’s
housing related functions and, in partnership with the
legislature, securing commitments of additional funds
for housing programs. Among the organizational
changes, DHCD was elevated to cabinet status within 
a new Executive Office of Housing and Economic
Development, and a Development Cabinet was created
in the Governor's office. Chaired by the Governor, the
Cabinet includes all of the major secretariats with
responsibilities for housing, economic development,
and labor, education, and transportation.
The Patrick administration recently announced a five-
year capital investment plan, which would raise the
State’s bond cap from $1.5 billion in 2008 to $2.0 billion
in 2012. The plan includes more than $170 million in
funding for public housing and private affordable
housing development in FY08, a 33 percent increase
over the prior year.
Update on Smart Growth Initiatives
In recent years the Commonwealth has stepped up its
efforts to encourage “smart growth” development with
an array of financial and regulatory incentives, includ-
ing financial assistance to communities that are hosting
large scale new development in smart growth locations.
Foremost among these new initiatives is the state’s
new Smart Growth Zoning law, Chapter 40R, and 
its companion school funding insurance program,
Chapter 40S. In a short period of time, these laws have
established an impressive track record. Just 18 months
after Chapter 40S’s passage, 15 communities had
approved 40R smart-growth districts. 
These districts have the potential of creating 5,700 new
housing units across the state, with 4,800 in Greater
Boston. In addition to the approved districts, more
than 30 communities statewide (25 in Greater Boston)
are actively considering them and/or have identified
specific developments, with the potential of creating
another 7,000 housing units, an encouraging response
to a new initiative. 
Smart growth planning received another public boost
in May 2007, when the Metropolitan Area Planning
Council (MAPC), the regional planning agency for
most of the communities covered by the Housing
Report Card, issued Metro Futures, its blueprint to
guide land use in the region between now and 2030.
Built on the principles of smart growth, the plan calls
for concentrating new residential development in areas
where the infrastructure is in place to sustain it. The
plan is consistent with the Commonwealth’s sustain-
able development principles and complements the
goals of 40R.
Conclusion
Performance Against New Paradigm Goals
After achieving in 2005, 90 percent of the 18,000 unit
per year housing production target established five
years earlier in the New Paradigm report, performance
against goal fell in 2006 to just 81 percent. Market rate
production, which had posted year-over-year gains
through 2005, retreated to below its 2004 level. New
subsidized housing, while still well above its 2002-2004
performance was down by 4 percent from 2005. Only
student housing, among the three tracked sectors,
gained ground in 2006. At current permitting levels in
2007, it is possible that only about 55 percent of the
original New Paradigm target will be reached by the
end of this year. 
The original target represented an estimate of how
much housing was needed in Greater Boston to bring
supply and demand into alignment given reasonable
estimates of population and job growth. With slower
growth than originally projected in both, housing
demand has been weaker than expected so housing
prices have not risen appreciably faster than general
inflation and have actually declined over the past 
two years.
How Much is Enough?
The Housing Report Card was developed to evaluate
current performance in meeting the region’s housing
needs. It is beyond the scope of this project to predict
what might be required in 5, 10, or 15 years, especially
given the uncertainty in the national housing markets
and the regional economy. There is a danger in over-
building—as other regions of the country are learn-
ing—just as there is in under-producing housing, as 
we chronically do in Massachusetts. The question we
posed for this year’s Housing Report Card is whether
the original housing target of 18,000 new units per 
year in Greater Boston is still valid. 
To test this, we relied on the five year economic
development forecast of the New England Economic
Partnership (NEEP), the region’s foremost economic
forecasting organization. 
Based on their best forecast of employment growth
between 2007 and 2012 and assuming 1.3 workers 
per household, we estimate that we will still need 
about 18,000 new units of housing per year over the
foreseeable future. Obviously, if economic growth is
much slower than NEEP predicts, housing demand
will be lower. If the pace of economic growth picks up,
housing needs will be higher. But if Greater Boston
enjoys the same job growth predicted by NEEP for
Massachusetts between 2007 and 2012, 18,000 new
units per year continues to be right on target for 
the region to adequately house what should be a
growing workforce. 
Challenge Moving Forward
What will be essential in any case is that state and 
local governments work together to assure that new
production—however much is required—can be
brought on line at more reasonable prices, and in a
timely, predictable manner. At a minimum, this means
ensuring a zoning and regulatory framework that
allows for adequate new production so that the
region’s housing supply can be increased promptly as
demand warrants. It means assuring an adequate
supply of housing for a cross section of ages and
incomes, with particular emphasis on homes that will
be attractive to young working families, a group that
is critical to the Commonwealth’s economic prosperity.
And finally, it means providing sufficient funding to
ensure that low-income households can find perma-
nent housing that is safe and affordable. We need to
solve this housing challenge or risk further deteriora-
tion in the region’s economy.
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The Greater Boston Housing Report Card series was
launched in 2002 to measure the progress the region
was making against housing production goals that 
had been established three years earlier in a report
prepared by Northeastern University’s Center for
Urban and Regional Policy at the behest of business
and community leaders. That report, A New Paradigm
for Housing in Greater Boston, had warned that the
region’s high housing costs and inadequate inventory
were threatening its economic competitiveness, and
the authors called for an ambitious five-year effort to
increase housing starts by 80 percent over existing
levels. 
Housing production had not kept pace with demand
as Boston’s economy surged into overdrive in the mid-
1990s following a prolonged economic recession in
1990-1991, and the region entered the 21st century
short some 38,000 housing units. This was the number
of additional units required to bring the housing
market back into balance, lifting vacancy rates to
national norms. Boosting production by this amount,
the New Paradigm’s authors theorized, would bring
home price appreciation into line with the overall rate 
of inflation. According to conventional economic
theory, the market should have responded to the
burgeoning demand by producing the required addi-
tional housing. It did not, and rents and home prices—
already among the highest in the nation—skyrocketed. 
Just three months after the original New Paradigm
report was issued, Boston—along with the nation—
sank into recession. While the nation was officially 
in recession for just eight months, the Massachusetts
recession lasted for 27 months (December 2000—
March 2003). The Commonwealth as a whole and 
the Greater Boston region lost population and their
economies have continued to grow more slowly than
the nation as a whole. Nonetheless, housing prices
continued to rise steeply between 2000 and 2005, 
while rents remained at near all-time highs. This was
despite the fact that during this period, housing starts
increased by more than 50 percent, albeit from very
low levels. By the second quarter of 2006, however, the
prolonged slump in job growth and essentially zero
population growth led to Boston’s housing and rental
vacancy rates rising to near normal levels. As a result,
rents remained relatively stable, and home prices were
finally dropping. 
Why then, are we still talking about a housing crisis?
There are at least three reasons: 
■ Affordability Housing affordability remains a
persistent problem. While the situation is most acute
for extremely low-income households, the region’s
high home prices make it difficult to attract and
retain workers across all income levels. 
■ Efficiency The process of bringing new housing 
to market in a timely and efficient manner when
demand does rise remains thwarted by the state’s
fragmented system of land use regulation and a
tortuous permitting process.
■ Sustainability Absent a road map to guide new
development in a rational, equitable, and sustain-
able manner, haphazard growth threatens to 
undermine the region’s quality of life.
Highlights of the 2005-2006 Report Card
Overview
Last year’s Report Card concluded that the Common-
wealth and the private sector had taken some impor-
tant steps to address the critical housing issues the
state, and the Greater Boston Region in particular, have
faced for more than a decade. Increased production of
new housing, including units built under the state’s
comprehensive permit statute, Chapter 40B,1 had
expanded the housing supply and helped bring
vacancy rates closer to normal levels. Additional
resources had been channeled into low-income hous-
ing production. Attention was focused in the state on
the need to encourage new development in sustainable
locations—to grow “smarter”—and new tools and
incentives, notably Chapters 40R and 40S, had been
put in place to encourage this to happen.
In terms of overall housing production in 2005, the
region achieved 91 percent of the annual target estab-
lished in the 2000 New Paradigm report. Affordable
housing production—defined as housing that qualifies
for inclusion on the State’s Subsidized Housing 
Inventory and is restricted to occupancy by low-
income households—was up as well. The majority of
the new affordable units, however, were being created
under Chapter 40B and, to a lesser extent, inclusionary
mandates in a handful of communities. Without addi-
tional subsidies to reduce the cost to produce and/or
lower the price paid by the tenant or homeowner, units
created in this way would not necessarily reach those
with the greatest need. As production tools, 40B and
inclusionary zoning require strong and rising market
conditions unless they are accompanied by subsidies. 
Even with the substantial new production, last year’s
Report Card cautioned that additional financial
resources and a combination of appropriate incentives
and sanctions were still required for Greater Boston 
to grow and maintain the attractive, affordable, and
sustainable housing supply so essential to the region’s
economic vitality.
Additional Findings from 2005-2006 
During the first nine months of 2005, many of the indi-
cators monitored by the Report Card had performed
much as they had in 2004: job growth remained slug-
gish; the region’s economy continued to improve, but
slowly; the rental market was relatively stable; and
home prices continued to rise, but more slowly than 
in prior years, and more slowly than in the nation as 
a whole. Inventories of existing property were increas-
ing, and more new units were being permitted as a
logjam of housing developments that had been stalled
in the planning and permitting process moved into
construction. The upturn in production, however, was
occurring just as the market was softening. By the end
of 2005, with interest rates rising and inventories
increasing, consumers were taking a more cautious
approach to home buying. 
The emerging story by the end of 2005 was a sea
change in housing market conditions that left pundits
debating whether the long anticipated correction was
a bubble bursting, or simply an overheated market
deflating. Home sales began to slow in the second
quarter of 2005 and fell each succeeding quarter
compared to the corresponding period a year earlier.
The rate of home price appreciation dropped from an
11.8 percent year-over-year increase in the first quarter
of 2005 to only 1.5 percent by the fourth quarter. By 
the end of the first quarter of 2006, the median single
family home price had actually declined from its first
quarter 2005 level, the first such price decline since
1992. The drop became more pronounced in the 
second quarter of 2006.
The rental market, on the other hand, showed signs of
strengthening at the end of 2005 with rents stabilizing
after several years of price declines. But with more
new production queued up than at any point in the
preceding 15 years—both rental and ownership—and
much of it highly concentrated in a few locations or in
specific market segments (e.g., high end rentals, luxury
condos, age restricted housing), the likelihood was
growing that at least some of that new production
would be off-cycle by the time it was brought to
market. This fear began to put a damper on plans 
for additional development in virtually all segments 
of the region’s housing market. 
What Has Changed Since 2005-2006
A Glass Half Empty
Looking at the Greater Boston housing market in 2007,
homeowners could become uneasy, especially if they
had purchased their homes when prices peaked in
mid-2005. The region has now experienced home price
depreciation (measured as the percent change from
the same quarter a year earlier) for the past six quarters.
Single family home prices for the second quarter of
2007, the most recent for which data are available, 
registered a 1.4 percent drop compared to the second
quarter of 2006. This followed a 1.3 percent second
quarter decline between 2006 and 2005 (See Table 1.1.)
The number of single family home sales was down 5.4
percent, to its lowest level in 15 years, as fewer buyers
were interested in purchasing in a market that might
soften further—and those who were not under any
time pressure to sell their homes, remained on the 
sidelines waiting for prices to firm up. Affordability 
for homeowners has improved slightly as a result of
declining prices, but after a full decade of powerful
price appreciation, it remains a problem, especially for
first time homebuyers. Affordability for renters, on the
other hand, has only grown worse as their inflation
adjusted incomes continue to drop. To make matters
worse, statewide foreclosure filings jumped by 70
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percent from 11,493 in 2005 to 19,487 in 2006,2 prompt-
ing the Governor to file legislation to provide foreclo-
sure protections for homeowners adversely affected by
subprime lenders. 
TABLE 1.1
Change in Massachusetts Home Sales and 
Price by Quarter (Year over Year)
Quarter # of Sales Median Price
1Q 2005 4.5% 11.8%
2Q 2005 -5.4% 6.4%
3Q 2005 -1.5% 5.7%
4Q 2005 -8.1% 1.5%
1Q 2006 -6.5% -0.9%
2Q 2006 -10.6% -1.3%
3Q 2006 -23.4% -4.9%
4Q 2006 -14.5% -2.9%
1Q 2007 2.8% -1.1%
2Q 2007 -5.4% -1.4%
Source: Massachusetts Association of Realtors
Note: Table compares number of sales and median price in
a given quarter to the number of sales and median price reported for
the same period a year earlier (for example, there were 2.8% more
sales during 1Q:2007 than there had been in 1Q:2006, but the median
price was 1.1% lower). These are statewide figures. Comparable
quarterly data for the 161 cities and towns covered by the Report
Card were not available, but they would exhibit a similar trend.)
Or Half Full?
Still, the news has not been all bad. Home sales, though
continuing to slide, are still at relatively high levels.
Excess inventories are gradually being absorbed. Home
buyers are finding a greater selection of homes from
which to choose, at somewhat more reasonable prices,
than in the recent past. Even though interest rates are
rising, they remain at historically low levels, and home
ownership is now within reach of more households.
While Massachusetts and the Boston metro area remain
among the nation’s priciest housing markets, the gap
between home prices here and in other parts of the
country has narrowed. The economy is growing, albeit
slowly, and for the first time since the 2000 recession,
Massachusetts added jobs at a rate faster than the
nation during the first six months of 2007. 
So notwithstanding all the media focus on housing, 
the situation is not as bleak for current homeowners 
as might be imagined nor as hopeful for those who 
are still trying to get into the housing market.
We’re Not Unique – the National Context
It is also true that Massachusetts was not the only state
to experience a dramatic run up in housing prices in
recent years, and it is not alone in the downturn. From
2000-2005, housing experienced a prolonged boom
nationwide. Sales of both new and existing homes set
records for five straight years as buyers were attracted
by the lowest mortgage rates in more than four
decades and what seemed to be the prospect of sure
fire gains on any housing investment. But big declines
in sales and starts in 2006 turned housing from one of
the economy's star performers into one of its worst,
with some economists estimating that this sector alone
was responsible for knocking a full percentage point
from the overall GDP growth rate in the third and
fourth quarters of 2006.
The National Association of Realtors reported that 
sales declined in 40 states in the fourth quarter of 2006
compared to the same period in 2005. The states with
the biggest declines were Nevada, Florida, Arizona,
and California. The markets that had been the hottest
were among those hardest hit once the five-year hous-
ing boom came to an end. By December 2006, the
median home price had dropped in 40 states as well,
and in nearly half the nation’s largest 149 metro areas.
Price declines this broad-based indicate just how
substantial a price correction the nation is experiencing.
Regions like the industrial Midwest where the economy
is in turmoil and job layoffs are widespread are experi-
encing housing price declines, but the same is true in
prosperous states like California, Florida, Nevada, and
Arizona where a heavy influx of speculators had bid
up prices even faster than in Massachusetts.
Clearly the current disarray in the housing market is a
national phenomenon with its roots in the very factors
that caused housing prices to skyrocket until 2005.
Supply constraints aggravated the housing affordabil-
ity problem in Massachusetts and in a handful of other
metropolitan areas on the east and west coasts, but a
host of other factors fueled the recent housing boom.
These include:
■ Historically low interest rates; 
■ A well developed and highly liquid mortgage
market;
■ New “alternative” mortgage instruments, which
reduced initial carrying costs to very low levels, and
15T h e  G r e a t e r  B o s t o n  H o u s i n g  R e p o r t  C a r d  2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7
■ Section 3 describes changes in housing supply
including where new production is taking place 
and what types of units are being developed. It 
also examines the infrastructure limitations that
pose barriers to siting new development within 
the region
■ Section 4 analyzes changes in rents, home prices,
and housing affordability for the region as a whole
and for specific towns and cities.
■ Section 5 focuses specifically on affordable housing
production and looks at where it is being built and
for whom, who is building it, and what tools they
are using. This year’s report also provides an
update on important 2006 accomplishments to
preserve the existing public and subsidized 
housing inventory.
■ Section 6 looks at what has happened to public
funding levels and government support for housing
since the last report card was issued. It also reviews
the region’s recent smart growth efforts and
provides an update on Chapter 40R development
and the Metropolitan Area Planning Council’s
newly minted Metro Futures regional master plan.
■ And finally, Section 7 provides a summary conclu-
sion of how the region performed against the
production targets set forth in the New Paradigm
report. Since those targets were established for a
five-year period, and this is the fifth and final
assessment against those targets, we are able to 
say something about how close we came to meeting
those early goals. 
Two appendices are also a critical part of this report
card. They provide key performance indicators for
each of the region’s 161 municipalities:
■ Appendix A presents the municipality-by-municipal-
ity results of the 2006-2007 affordability gap analysis
discussed in Section 4.
■ Appendix B is the municipal scorecard, a diagnostic
tool for local leaders to use in evaluating their own
performance in the larger regional context. By
aggregating housing production data from several
sources, the scorecard facilitates comparison across
individual municipalities of the contribution each is
making to increase the supply of affordable housing
(discussed in Section 5). Appendix B illustrates that
some communities have responded proactively to
the region’s housing challenges while others
continue to lag.
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the aggressive marketing of such products to very
low-income households and those with damaged
credit;
■ A relaxing of credit standards, as securitization
enabled lenders to lay off the risk of loans—
including subprime loans—onto investors 
attracted by the securities’ favorable rates; 
■ The relative attractiveness of housing compared 
to other investment options; and
■ The purchasing power and predilections of the giant
Baby Boom generation and other emerging market
segments such as recent immigrants.
Many observers note, too, the role that market psychol-
ogy plays, suggesting that exuberant expectations were
a major factor.3
The real estate industry had predicted that home prices
would stabilize by the end of 2006 and would begin to
climb thereafter, but many analysts now expect the
weakness in the market to continue into 2008 as still
large inventories of unsold homes get absorbed.
Absorbing that overhang, analysts note, will be
complicated if lenders tighten credit standards 
because of concerns about rising mortgage default
rates or if mortgage interest rates rise. The fact that
Massachusetts experienced less overbuilding and less
property-flipping by investors than many markets may
hasten its recovery, but even in areas that did not expe-
rience overbuilding, “discretionary” buyers and sell-
ers—those who do not have to move—are waiting on
the sidelines to see where the market is headed. As a
result prices have fallen, but not precipitously, from
their 2005 peaks and affordability remains a major
problem in the region for both young working 
families and for low-income households generally.
Organization of Report
This year’s Report Card analyzes these changes and
describes where progress has—and has not—been
made in the past 18 months (January 2006-June 2007).
This report card follows a format similar to its prede-
cessors:
■ Section 2 provides an overview of current market
conditions based on an analysis of recent economic
activity and the most up-to-date demographic data
available from the U.S. Census and other sources
Analysts differ on how deep and prolonged the
region’s housing recession will be, and how great a
drag it will be on the Commonwealth’s economic
recovery. A similar debate, meanwhile, is taking place
at the national level where home sales and housing
starts have plummeted, inventories have risen, and
house price appreciation has slowed or turned nega-
tive in many markets. 
In Massachusetts home sales, prices and construction
starts were down in 2006. They have continued to slide
through the first six months of 2007, while delinquen-
cies and foreclosures have continued to climb. This
comes despite a slight recovery in the state’s overall
economy. Measured by employment, output, labor
force, and population growth, 2006 was the region’s
best performance to date in its otherwise lackluster
economic recovery, and the outlook has continued to
improve a bit through the first six months of 2007 rela-
tive to national trends. This section reports on recent
economic activity, job growth, and population move-
ment and examines the link between employment
growth and housing prices. 
Economic Update
Overview
The Economic Activity Index is a monthly indicator
derived from total nonfarm employment levels, 
unemployment rates, average hours worked in 
manufacturing, and wage and salary disbursements.
Developed by economists at the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia, the index is a measure of 
overall economic performance. It illustrates the pace 
of growth in real gross state product relative to the 
July 1992 levels for each of the 50 states. While the
Massachusetts economy has been gaining strength
since bottoming out in 2002, and has been in positive
territory for the past three years, it grew at a slower
rate than the nation as a whole through 2006, register-
ing a 2.8 percent rise compared to 3.2 percent for the
nation. (Figure 2.1). Through April 2007, however, the
Commonwealth registered a 2.7 percent year over year
gain, closing in on the 2.9 percent gain for the nation.
Employment
The Massachusetts economy added just 35,000 new
jobs (1.1 percent) in 2006, lagging the national growth
rate of 1.7 percent. Another 29,200 jobs were created 
in the first six months of 2007, this time at a rate of
increase slightly greater than that experienced by the
country as a whole. Even with this recent improve-
ment, there were at mid-year 102,000 fewer people
working in the Commonwealth than there had been 
at the pre-recession peak in February 2001. (See Figure
2.2.) Moreover, the current rate of job growth is still so
anemic that at this pace, employment in the Common-
wealth will not be back to its previous peak until some-
time in 2011. 
2.
Current Market Conditions










































Year Over Year Change in Economic Activity Index,
Massachusetts v. U.S.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (July 2000 = 100, not seasonally adjusted
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Figure 2.3 provides additional information on where
Massachusetts employment has been particularly
weak. Between 2000 and 2006, the Commonwealth
actually experienced a somewhat higher job growth
rate in construction than the nation as a whole. It 
lost nearly a quarter of its high tech manufacturing
employment base, but so did the country. Where Mass-
achusetts performed poorly relative to the rest of the
nation was in financial services, computer services,
private education, and health care. While the U.S.
experienced an 8 percent increase in jobs in the finan-
cial services industry, the state lost jobs. Nationally
computer service employment expanded by about 
2 percent, but it plummeted by nearly 18 percent in
Massachusetts. Private education employment grew in
the Commonwealth, but at only one-fifth the national
rate. Health care employment expanded by a robust 10
percent here, but this was only two-thirds the rate the
nation recorded. Thus, the Commonwealth’s weak 
job performance can be traced to a less than stellar
performance in the very industries that we have
believed to be the key sectors for our future prosperity:
computer services, health care, and education.
Jan 1996 to Feb 2001: +386,100
Feb 2001 to Dec 2003: -205,100
Dec 2003 to Dec 2006: +79,100
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Employment Growth by Sector (2000-2006)
Massachusetts v. U.S. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
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Employment growth in the Boston metro area,4 the
economic engine of the state and New England,
followed a similar pattern: 27,300 new jobs were created
in 2006, representing a rate of growth of 1.1 percent, and
another 17,100 were added in the first six months of
2007. Generating the most new jobs were the profes-
sional and business services and education and health
services sectors, adding 10,100 and 12,900 jobs respec-
tively. As Figure 2.4 demonstrates, the gap in the
employment growth rate between the Boston Metro
area and the U.S. has narrowed since 2002, but jobs are
still being created faster nationwide than here in Boston.
While three out of five workers in the Greater Boston
region work in the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy “metro-
politan division,” the workforce is spread out over a
much larger commuting area as Table 2.1 indicates.
Moreover, the growth in the outer reaches of the region
has been slightly faster than in the Boston-Cambridge-
Quincy center. Between the beginning of 2004 and
April 2007, the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy labor
market (the core) has expanded by 3.8 percent. 









































Employment Growth, Boston Metro Area v. U.S.
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 
TABLE 2.1
Where People Work in and Around Greater Boston (in 000’s)
Haverhill-
Boston- Brockton- North Lowell- Lynn- Leominster-
Cambridge- Bridgewater- Andover- Billerica- Peabody- Nashua, Fitchbury- New 
# of Jobs* Quincy Easton Framingham Amesbury Chelmsford Salem NH Worcester Gardner Bedford
# Employed at Peak 
(1/2001) 1,772.9 92.0 157.7 82.3 125.6 104.1 127.9 246.2 54.0 67.4
# Employed at Trough 
(1/2004) 1,634.1 89.2 148.3 74.7 117.0 101.4 126.7 242.3 51.5 64.4
# Jobs Lost Peak to Trough 138.8 2.8 9.4 7.6 8.6 2.7 1.2 3.9 2.5 3.0
Chg 1/01 - 1/04 7.8% 3.0% 6.0% 9.2% 6.8% 2.6% 0.9% 1.6% 4.6% 4.5%
Jobs added Since 1/2004 61.5 2.9 7.7 4.2 2.1 1.6 8.0 8.1 -0.3 3.7
Chg 1/2004 - 4/2007 3.8% 3.3% 5.2% 5.6% 1.8% 1.6% 6.3% 3.3% -0.6% 5.7%
# Employed, April 2007 1,695.6 92.1 156 78.9 119.1 103 134.7 250.4 51.2 68.1
4/2007 Jobs Compared to 
Prior Peak -77.3 0.1 -1.7 -3.4 -6.5 -1.1 6.8 4.2 -2.8 0.7
% Below Peak -4.4% 0.1% -1.1% -4.1% -5.2% -1.1% 5.3% 1.7% -5.2% 1.0%
# Jobs added 1/2006 - 4/2007 31.9 1.1 0.6 1.2 1 0.8 2.3 4.2 0.1 1.6
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 4/2007 (Employment in 000s, not seasonally adjusted) 
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy as percent of All Employment—62.6% at peak, 61.6% currently
* Total nonagricultural employment, NECTA divisions of the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy Metropolitan NECTA and the Nashua, Worcester,
Fitchburg, and New Bedford metro areas. To get total jobs in the Boston-Quincy-Cambridge Metropolitan NECTA (aka the metro area), you
must add up its 6 metropolitan divisions, including the one bearing the same name as the larger metro area (Boston-Cambridge-Quincy)
North Andover-Amesbury by 5.6 percent, New
Bedford by 5.7 percent, and Nashua, New Hampshire
by 6.3 percent. This certainly affects where new hous-
ing and better transportation is most needed.
Interest Rates
A good part of the story about home prices is related 
to the trend in interest rates. As Figure 2.5 reveals, 
the average 30-year fixed rate mortgage declined 
from 8.21% in January 2000 to 5.71% in January 2005. 
This substantial decline in interest rates encouraged
millions of households nationwide to become home-
owners, including many in Greater Boston. As a result,
the short-term demand for housing increased sharply.
In much of the country this increased demand was
accompanied by a rise in housing starts, but in Massa-
chusetts there was no corresponding increase in the
supply of single family homes. Strict zoning and land
use regulations in many Massachusetts communities
precluded developers from building housing fast
enough to meet the new demand, even as housing
prices soared.
With interest rates beginning to rise in 2005 from their
40-year lows, demand began to slow. By July 2007,
rates were nearly a full point higher than they had
been two years earlier. Rising interest rates have both 
a real and perceived dampening effect on house prices.
The increase in interest rate from July 2005’s 5.7% to
June 2007’s 6.7% added 11% onto the cost of a $300,000
fixed rate 30-year mortgage. That means the same
monthly payment that had “bought” a $300,000 mort-
gage in 2005 covered only a $270,000 mortgage two
years later. By the same token, that payment would
have covered only a $232,000 mortgage five years
earlier at 2000’s prevailing rate of 8.0%. As the cost 
to carry drops, more people jump into the market
bidding prices up, which is what happened between
2000 and 2005.5 When the cost to carry rises—as it is
doing now—the number of qualified buyers goes
down, putting downward pressure on prices. 
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National Average 30-Year Mortgage Rates (January 2000-July 2007)
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Housing Market 
In 2007, the region’s housing market has continued to
soften with the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise
Oversight ranking Massachusetts 49th of the 50 states
in terms of price appreciation for the year ending
March 31, 2007. Only Michigan, with its depressed
auto industry, saw prices decline by more. The recent
Massachusetts experience, of course, stands in sharp
contrast to the double-digit increases posted annually
between 1999 and 2004. Trends in home prices are
discussed in greater detail in Section 4, but many
analysts now expect housing prices to continue to
decline through the remainder of 2007 and the first two
quarters of 2008. The most recent projections from the
New England Economic Partnership (NEEP) suggest
that the sharpest declines in home prices will be in the
second, third, and fourth quarters of 2007, followed 
by more modest reductions, and then slow recovery. 
NEEP predicts a peak-to-trough decline in the region’s
median housing price of just under 12 percent. This
compares to Moody’s economy.com forecasted peak-
to-trough decline of 8 percent for the nation as a whole.
While this represents a significant drop—both for the
Greater Boston region and the nation as a whole—the
decline is not expected to be as pronounced as it was 
in the recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Even
with a 12 percent decline from peak prices, the median
price of existing single family homes in Greater Boston
would fall only to about their 2003 level, or $343,000.
They would remain 50 percent higher than they were
in 2000, and nearly double their 1997 selling price. So
even with a major market correction, affordability will
continue to be a problem for many households, includ-
ing young working families.
Income
The affordability problem has been compounded 
by what has happened, and continues to happen, to
household income. Massachusetts residents continue
to enjoy one of the highest incomes in the nation, but
income growth for lower and middle income wage
earners has stagnated in recent years. Moreover,
income is expected to grow more slowly than the
national average over the coming year. Between 1999
and 2005, nominal household income in the Greater
Boston region increased by just over 13 percent. 
In light of slow income growth, we can assess what has
happened to affordability for Boston area homebuyers
between 1999 and 2007. By combining data on housing
prices, interest rates, and household incomes, and
using the 12 percent peak-to-trough price decline
projected by NEEP, we can develop three separate
measures of housing affordability 
(1) Household income available for housing expense
compared to the income required to qualify for a mort-
gage—This is the affordability index presented in
Appendix A for each of the municipalities covered
by the Report Card. If a median income household
has exactly enough income to qualify for a loan on
the median priced home, the index will be 1.00. If
the index is above 1.00, the homebuyer has more
than enough income to qualify; below that, the
housing is unaffordable. 
(2) Median house price expressed as a multiple of
income—This is a frequently used measure of
affordability, but it may exaggerate the affordability
problem in periods of rapidly rising home prices,
but low interest rates, as we experienced during the
first half of this decade.
(3) Cost to carry a mortgage as a percent of income—
This measure accounts for changes in interest rates
as well as price and income change.
As Table 2.2 illustrates, all three measures tell the same
story: even if prices drop from their 2005 highs by 12
percent, Boston area homebuyers will find housing
only marginally more affordable. The area’s housing
will remain substantially less affordable than it was at
the beginning of the decade.
TABLE 2.2
Tracking Shifts in Homeownership Affordability 
Affordability Index Median House Price Cost to Carry 
Year Median HH Income/ as Multiple of as % of
Income Reqd* Median HH Income Median HH Income
1999 1.05 3.8 31.50%
2005 0.74 6.3 44.60%
2007 0.81 5.3 40.60%
* Assumes 80% fixed rate, 30-year mortgage at prevailing rate on the
median priced single family home as reported by the Warren Group
Publications for 1999 and 2005; real estate taxes and insurance equal
to 1.5% of sales price; and qualifying debt-to-income ratio of 33%;
household income as reported in the 2000 Decennial Census (1999)
and the American Community Survey (2005); 2007 income was
estimated to have increased 2% per year in 2006 and 2007. 2007
median home price was estimated to have dropped from its 2005
high by 12%.
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Economic Outlook
Economists at the New England Economic Partnership
predict that the region’s economic growth will continue
at a moderate pace. Although the continued weakness
in the housing market will have a negative influence on
growth, it should be offset by increased national and
worldwide demand for the technology products and
knowledge-based services that the region supplies.
NEEP projects an average annual rate of employment
growth over the next five years of 0.85 percent, slightly
greater than the long-term average rate of growth of
0.69 percent from 1980 through 2006, but well below 
the average for the two prior expansions in the 1980s
and 1990s (4.8 percent and 2.2 percent, respectively).
If Massachusetts can meet this forecasted employment
growth rate, total employment in the Commonwealth
will grow by 142,000 jobs between May 2007 and May
2112. Greater Boston (the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy
Metropolitan NECTA) would grow by 107,000 if it
matched the state growth rate. 
Of course, this is just one forecast. There are a number
of factors that affect employment growth in any one
state or region and therefore it is difficult to accurately
project the jobs trajectory into the next decade. If a
national recession were to take hold in the next five
years, employment would again decline. Recall that
Massachusetts is still more than 100,000 jobs shy of its
peak before the 2001 recession. Section 7 looks at how
the region’s housing demand might be expected to
grow under varying employment projections.
Demographic Update
After having experienced back to back years of popula-
tion decline, Massachusetts registered an incremental
increase in population (1/10 of 1 percent) between July
2005 and June 2006. The population of the Bay State
now stands at 6, 437,193, a gain of 135, 917 (2.2 percent)
over what had been reported in the 2000 Census. The
161 cities and towns covered by the Housing Report
Card had fared even worse, recording population
losses for three consecutive years. This trend, too, was
reversed between 2005-2006, also with a 1/10 of 1
percent increase. The region’s population now is 
just 1.1 percent higher than it was in 2000. 
While the Census Bureau’s 2006 population estimates
are available for inclusion in the 2006-2007 Report Card,
most other demographic data comes from the Bureau’s
American Community Survey (ACS), which lags by one
year. Thus, the data included in this section, which
document some important, but subtle shifts in the
region’s population since 2000, are from the 2005 survey.
Table 2.3 highlights some of these shifts for Essex,
Middlesex, Norfolk, Plymouth, and Suffolk Counties.6
Noteworthy changes from prior years include the
following:
■ The number of households increased incrementally
in 2005, reversing three years of declines, but it is
still 0.57 percent lower than it was in 2000. 
■ Inflation adjusted incomes have fallen, most
dramatically for renter households. Real median
renter income in 2005 was nearly 8 percent lower
than it had been five years earlier. Real median
homeowner income was up by just 1 percent.
■ Affordability is a growing problem, with a rising
number of cost burdened renters and homeowners.
The increase has been particularly pronounced
among renter households, half of whom now pay 
in excess of 30 percent of income for rent, including
one in four who pay more than 50 percent. Nearly
40 percent homeowners are paying in excess of 30
percent for their house payments, up from just 27
percent of homeowners in 2000.
■ Accompanying the sharp increase in home values
between 2000 and 2005 was an increase in real estate
taxes, homeowner’s insurance, and home heating
fuel costs that has resulted in an increase in housing
expenses even for homeowners who own their
property outright.
■ The number of housing units grew at the same rate
as the number of households between 2004-2005,
but since 2000 the increase in housing supply has
exceeded the increase in households, contributing 
to a rise in vacancies. Total housing units are up by 
2 percent while the number of households is down
by about half a percent.
■ The number of renter households grew by 3 percent
in 2005, marking the first time in five years that
there has been an increase in renters and a decline 
in owner-occupants. Still, there are 8 percent fewer
renter households living in the five counties than
there had been in 2000, while the number of owner
occupants has increased by more than 4 percent
during the same period.
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TABLE 2.3
Demographic Profile, 1990, 2000-2005
% Change/ % Change/
Indicator* 1990 2000 2002 2004 2005 2004-2005 2000-2005
Population 3,783,817 4,001,752 3,908,316 3,881,809 3,864,921 -0.44% -3.42%
Households 1,410,238 1,533,041 1,517,712 1,516,275 1,524,296 0.53% -0.57%
Real Median 
Household Income* $60,037 $62,481 $65,569 $64,060 $62,462 -2.49% -0.03%
Real Median 
Family Income* $72,038 $76,492 $79,145 $77,779 $76,706 -1.38% 0.28%
Real Median 
Homeowner Income* NA $80,995 $82,925 $80,936 $81,886 1.17% 1.10%
Real Median 
Renter Income* NA $38,780 $39,602 $39,762 $35,748 -10.10% -7.82%
Families Below 
Poverty Level 59,124 59,913 58,882 68,687 68,038 -0.94% 13.56%
Total Housing Units 1,510,420 1,593,023 1,606,322 1,616,578 1,625,201 0.53% 2.02%
Occupied Units 1,412,190 1,532,549 1,517,712 1,516,275 1,524,296 0.53% -0.54%
Vacant Units 98,230 60,474 88,610 100,303 100,905 0.60% 66.86%
Owner Occupied Units 812,660 916,817 937,890 965,201 956,373 -0.91% 4.31%
Renter Occupied Units 599,530 615,732 579,822 551,074 567,923 3.06% -7.76%
Median Value Owner 
Occupied Units* $267,573 $253,378 $337,613 $393,461 $411,870 4.68% 62.55%
Median Gross Monthly Rent* $960 $891 $1,028 $1,032 $1,042 0.94% 16.91%
Renter HHs Paying >30% 
of Income for Rent 41.7% 39.2% 42.9% 46.1% 50.1% 8.74% 27.74%
Renter HHs Paying >50% 
of Income for Rent NA 18.4% 21.9% 21.9% 25.0% 14.25% 35.75%
Median Monthly Owner Cost 
(w mortgage)* $1,630 $1,709 $1,810 $1,901 $1,981 4.20% 15.90%
Median Monthly Owner Cost 
(w/o mortgage)* $497 $523 $528 $599 $622 3.92% 19.03%
Homeowners (w mortgage) 
Paying >30%* 28.3% 26.7% 30.8% 37.5% 39.3% 4.91% 47.09%
Homeowners (w mortgage) 
Paying >50%* 9.0% 9.2% 14.1% 13.9% -2.01% 54.36%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey (ACS), 2001-2005, Decennial Census, 1990 and 2000. 
*All income and housing costs are reported in 2005 dollars
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The Link Between Home Prices, Jobs, and Population
Out-migration from Massachusetts is closely correlated
with the performance of the state’s economy and job
growth. Since 2000 net domestic out-migration—the
difference in the number of people moving into the
state and the number leaving (not including foreign
immigrants)—increased annually from a loss of 3,623
in 2000 to 61,522 in 2005. This corresponds to the high
levels of job loss between 2001 through early 2004. In
2006, as the state’s economy began to add jobs, there
was a modest improvement: a net out-migration of just
49,529 (see Figure 2.6). 
The loss in population due to domestic out-migration is
particularly acute among young individuals aged 20 to
34, as Figure 2.7 demonstrates. Between 2000 and 2005,
the population of 20 to 24 year olds and 25 to 34 year
olds declined by nearly 9 percent—while there was
population growth nationally among the former group
and a decline of less than 3 percent among the latter.
Last year’s Report Card documented in some detail the
relationship between housing costs, employment, and
population, and that will not be repeated here except
to say that we now have strong evidence that metro
areas whose average housing cost puts them in the top
decile in terms of housing costs nationally are essen-
tially pricing themselves out of the market in terms of
population and employment growth. The continuing
pattern we see in net domestic outmigration and in the
loss of young working age residents is at least partly a
manifestation of the link between high housing costs
and demographic trends.
Population Shifts within the Region
According to the Census Bureau’s most recent 
population estimates, the fastest growing 
communities—in terms of absolute population 
gain, not percentage increase—include Peabody 
and Hingham where the growth has resulted from
the construction of Linden Ponds (Hingham) and
Brooksby Village (Peabody), large continuing care
retirement communities that have added more than
1,700 new housing units in Peabody since 2000 and 
800 in Hingham. The Hingham development, which
opened in 2004 also will include more than 1,700 units
when fully built out. Other high growth communities
include Plymouth and Middleborough, the region’s
largest municipalities in terms of landmass, as well as
Raynham, Abington, Quincy, Billerica, Burlington,
Pembroke, Marlborough, Franklin, Boston, Middleton,
and Andover. 
The fastest growing communities elsewhere in the
Massachusetts include a number of Worcester and 
Bristol County cities and towns on the periphery of 
the Boston metro area: Worcester, Grafton, Shrewsbury,
Uxbridge, Charlton, Rutland, Northbridge, Holden,






























































Massachusetts Domestic Net-Migration 
and Foreign Immigration
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, State Population Estimates, Components of Population Change
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Across the nation—even in supply-constrained markets
like Greater Boston—2006 was the year that the housing
boom market abruptly shifted gears. Waning demand,
rising inventories, tightening credit standards in the
wake of the subprime debacle, rising interest rates, 
and consumer wariness led to a sharp drop in new
construction throughout much of the country in 2006
and through the first six months of 2007. Greater Boston
was no exception. This section of the Housing Report
Card examines recent changes in the region’s housing
supply, including the type and location of housing
permitted during 2006 and through the first half of 2007.
The primary source used to estimate housing produc-
tion here, and elsewhere, is building permit data
collected by the U.S. Census Bureau through its 
Building Permits Survey. Despite some limitations, 
the Building Permits Survey is widely recognized as
the national standard, and over 98 percent of all
permits issued result in actual production.8 CURP
supplements and verifies the building permit data
with its own extensive tracking system for key market
segments and targeted programs (e.g., subsidized
housing, student housing, age restricted housing) to
ensure a more complete and accurate assessment of 
the region’s housing production than is provided by
building permits alone. 
Overall Production Levels
After three years of double digit increases, the number
of new housing units permitted in Greater Boston
dropped by nearly 12 percent in 2006. Single family
permitting declined by more than 25 percent, while
multifamily (units in buildings of 5 or more units) fell
by just over 2 percent. By 2006, single family produc-
tion was accounting for less than 40 percent of the
region’s permits, the lowest level since the Report 
Card began tracking this statistic. (See Table 3.1) 
3.
Housing Production in the Region
TABLE 3.1
Single Family v. Multifamily Building Permits in Greater Boston
% Change from % Change from
% Change Units in % Change Single Prior Year Prior Year
Over Prior Single from Family Units in (Units in Units in (Units in
Total Year (Total Family Prior Year as % of 2-4 Unit 2-4 Unit 5+ Unit Buildings w
Year Units Units) Structures (SF Units) Total Structures Structures) Structures 5+ units)
1998 10,846 8,639 79.7% 574 1,633
1999 10,662 -1.7% 7,775 -10.0% 72.9% 746 30.0% 2,141 31.1%
2000 10,342 -3.0% 7,102 -8.7% 68.7% 701 -6.0% 2,539 18.6%
2001 9,701 -6.2% 6,313 -11.1% 65.1% 686 -2.1% 2,702 6.4%
2002 9,520 -1.9% 6,408 1.5% 67.3% 764 11.4% 2,348 -13.1%
2003 12,121 27.3% 6,020 -6.1% 49.7% 1,093 43.1% 5,003 113.1%
2004 13,556 11.8% 7,000 16.3% 51.6% 994 -9.1% 5,562 11.2%
2005 15,561 14.8% 7,270 3.9% 46.7% 1,015 2.1% 7,276 30.8%
2006 13,759 -11.6% 5,429 -25.3% 39.5% 1,224 20.6% 7,107 -2.3%
2007 est. 9,950 -27.7% 4,094 -24.6% 41.1% 713 -41.7% 5,228 -26.4%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau Building Permit Survey for the 161 cities and towns
Note: The number of multifamily units (5+) and total units for 2005 has been revised downward by 384 from what was reported in last year’s
Housing Report Card. Those units were carried forward into 2006. 2007 estimate is based on preliminary data from the Boston-Cambridge-
Quincy MA-NH Metro Area and is not directly comparable to prior years.
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Boston’s 2006 performance mirrored the national
trend, which saw permits overall fall by almost 15
percent with single family permitting down by 18
percent and multifamily by 1.3 percent. Unlike Greater
Boston, however, over the past decade, single family
permits accounted for 75 percent of all activity nation-
ally. Moreover, single family permitting rose by 28
percent nationally over the past decade (1996-2006),
while it fell by 28 percent here
The permitting of new homes has dropped even more
sharply in 2007, as Figure 3.1 illustrates. Nationally
overall permitting during the first six months of the
year was down by nearly 26 percent compared to the
same period in 2006, and analysts are estimating that
2007 will be the worst year for housing starts in more
than a decade. Single family permitting was off by
nearly 29 percent and multifamily by 14 percent. 
In Massachusetts, permitting is likely to drop to a 
level not seen since 1991. Through June single family
permitting in Greater Boston was down by 25 percent
and multifamily by 26 percent. On an annual basis, this
will put the number of single family homes permitted
at its lowest level in at least 28 years.
2006 Housing Production by Type 
and Location
Permitting of new housing units in 2006 was up over
2005 levels in just 44 Greater Boston communities out
of the 161 while single family permitting rose in only
37. In both cases, this was about half the number of
municipalities that experienced increased production
in 2005. More than 70 percent (114) of the region’s 
cities and towns are now permitting fewer single
family residences than they were in 2000.
Multifamily housing was permitted in 45 communities
in 2005, slightly less than the 48 that had permitted
such units in each of the preceding three years, but a
substantial improvement over 1998 and 1999 when
only 20 communities permitted any multifamily units.
In 43 municipalities, including 16 of those that permit-
ted multifamily housing, production is occurring
under the provisions of Massachusetts General Law
(MGL) Chapter 40B. 
Development continues to be unevenly distributed
throughout the region due to differences in local
economic considerations, environmental constraints,
infrastructure capacity, local land use regulations, and
the dictates of the market. Between 2000-2005, nine
cities and four towns accounted for one-third of the
region’s new housing. The cities are: Boston, Quincy,
Peabody, Cambridge, Marlborough, Haverhill,
Waltham, Revere, and Salem; the towns include
Plymouth, Billerica, Burlington, and Franklin. Two-
thirds of the growth during the same period occurred
in 50 of the 161 municipalities, including these thirteen. 
As was the case in 2005, the principal production driv-
ers in 2006 were luxury rental apartments and condo-
miniums in the inner core; suburban development
permitted under 40B; age restricted housing, including
active adult developments and independent living
apartments; and single family homes built at medium
and low densities in the outer suburban ring or on infill
lots in mature suburbs.9 This new production is dispro-
portionately targeted to the high end of the market
and/or to those aged 55 or over. Many of the 40B devel-
opments include moderately priced single family
homes in their market rate component—in addition 
to the units specifically reserved for low and moderate
income households—but most of the other non-age
restricted single family production is geared to the
FIGURE 3.1
Year-Over-Year change in Units Authorized by
Buidling Permits, 2003-2007
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trade-up market, and priced accordingly. As would be
expected, prices of new single family homes drop the
further one moves from Boston. But even in Worcester
and Bristol Counties (and New Hampshire’s Rocking-
ham and Strafford Counties)—areas that had witnessed
significant new single family construction in the “under
$500,000 range”—production was down in 2006.
Table 3.2 identifies those communities that led the
region in permitting new housing in 2006 and those
that permitted the fewest new homes. All of the 2006
top producers achieved their numbers by approving
large multifamily developments. Most also included
affordable units in the mix, either because the new
developments were permitted under 40B—and thus
required a low income set aside—or because the
municipality had an inclusionary zoning requirement.
Danvers, North Andover, Billerica, and Newton are
examples of the former; Boston, Cambridge, and
Watertown are examples of the latter. Major 2006
developments in Quincy, Hingham, and Plymouth 
are age restricted to senior citizens.
Multifamily Homes
The Greater Boston region continued its improvement
on the multifamily front right through 2006, even
though the softness in the condominium market has
resulted in some projects being put on hold. A few
developers are rethinking their rental options, and still
others are phasing their developments. Several condo-
minium properties that were completed in 2006 are
being marketed, at least in the short term, as rentals
(e.g., the Brickworks in Cambridge and Parkway
Heights in Everett). This is the reverse of what was
happening in 2003 and 2004 when projects planned as
rental were converted mid-construction, or soon there-
after, to condominium in response to rapidly appreciat-
ing condominium prices and falling rents. 
Much of the new multifamily production, both rental
and homeownership, is concentrated in Smart Growth
locations. These include formerly vacant or underuti-
lized land and buildings in Boston and other inner core
cities, surplus state properties in suburban locations,
and sites adjacent to transit stations and commuter
corridors. One such example, Station Landing, was 
the recipient of a Commonwealth Massachusetts 2006
Smart Growth Award. Built in Medford adjacent to the
MBTA’s Wellington Station, Station Landing provides 
a mix of uses, including commercial and retail space,
restaurants, health and fitness facilities, in addition 
to a variety of housing types. 
Other 2006 rental developments10 include Avalon at
Lexington Hills in Lexington and Avalon at Hathorne
Hill in Danvers, both former state hospital sites.
Construction also commenced on a number of
suburban rental developments permitted under the
provisions of Chapter 40B. These include Princeton
Commons in Chelmsford, Heritage at Bedford Springs
in Bedford, Fairfield Green in Dedham, Quail Run in
Stoughton, Spence Farm in Reading, and Highland
Glen in Westwood. The Cordovan in Haverhill and
Arborpoint at Woodland Station, both examples of
transit oriented rental development in urban locations,
were also permitted under 40B. New residences 
were begun at the Natick Mall, and in Boston and
Cambridge construction commenced on nearly 
3,500 new rental and condominium homes.
Single Family Homes
Just the opposite has been occurring in single family
home construction. Low to begin with, it fell sharply 
in 2006 and again in the first half of 2007. Much of what
little is being built is being permitted under 40B, is 
age restricted, or both. The number of municipalities
permitting only single family homes had declined from
60 percent in 2001 to 47 percent in 2004, but in 2005 
it increased to 55 percent where it remained in 2006. 
More than half of the municipalities in Greater Boston
permitted fewer than 25 single family homes in 2006. 
With an increasing number of organizations and 
individuals calling for compact development and a
return to small lot sizes—one-quarter acre and less—
this year’s Report Card, for the first time, examines 
the major infrastructure barrier to increased housing
production in much of the region: the lack of public
sewers for wastewater disposal. 
Sewers v. Septic
Forty-three municipalities in and around Boston—
home to half the Commonwealth’s residents—are
within the jurisdiction of the Massachusetts Water
Resources Authority (MWRA), but 45 percent of 
the towns not serviced by MWRA have no public
sewers at all. In fact over 30 percent of the homes 
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TABLE 3.2
Municipalities Adding the Most and Fewest New Housing Units in 2006
5 Year Total Units
2006 Rank Permitted
Rank 2001-2005 Municipality 2006
Top 15
1 1 Boston 2,419
2 11 Cambridge 898
3 2 Quincy 641
4 30 Danvers 500
5 13 Hingham 374
6 9 Revere 299
7 40 Dedham 297
8 42 North Andover 294
9 5 Billerica 246
10 12 Newton 246
11 3 Plymouth 225
12 7 Waltham 219
13 29 Braintree 214
14 83 Watertown 199
15 34 Chelmsford 182
Bottom 15
15 12 Harvard 8
15 23 Cohasset 8
15 42 Hopedale 8
15 22 West Bridgewater 8
11 50 Pepperell 7
11 32 Millis 7
9 37 Berlin 6
9 6 Chelsea 6
7 2 Avon 5
6 18 Maynard 4
6 100 Milton 4
4 1 Nahant 3
4 13 Sherborn 3
4 10 Swampscott 3
1 7 Hamilton 2
0 5 Topsfield 1
Single 
5 Year Family Units
2006 Rank Permitted
Rank 2001-2005 Municipality 2006
Top 15
1 1 Plymouth 182
2 3 Lowell 143
3 67 Tyngsborough 116
4 15 Westford 105
5 31 Salisbury 98
6 78 Danvers 95
7 6 Haverhill 95
8 12 Boston 94
9 2 Billerica 90
10 9 Taunton 89
11 4 Wareham 87
12 23 Brockton 85
13 5 Middleborough 84
14 28 Franklin 75
15 8 Methuen 75
Bottom 15
14 10 Somerville 6
14 31 West Bridgewater 6
14 54 Berlin 6
14 49 Millis 5
12 4 Avon 5
12 9 Medford 4
10 15 Maynard 4
10 32 Milton 4
9 2 Nahant 3
7 11 Sherborn 3
7 8 Swampscott 3
4 5 Watertown 2
4 3 Winthrop 2
4 43 Salem 2
3 14 Hamilton 2
2 6 Topsfield 1




Rank 2001-2005 Municipality 2006
Top 15
1 1 Boston 1967
2 6 Cambridge 857
3 2 Quincy 584
4 20 Danvers 355
5 9 Hingham 340
6 22 Dedham 285
7 8 Revere 266
8 45 North Andover 192
9 41 Watertown 187
10 16 Newton 180
11 14 Braintree 180
12 11 Billerica 156
13 18 Saugus 134
14 7 Waltham 125
15 19 Canton 109
Bottom 15
NA – Most of the region’s
communities do not permit
any multifamily housing 
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in Massachusetts, as well as many small businesses
and institutions, are not served by public sewers.
Homes that are not connected to public sewers must
utilize another system for sewage disposal. In most
cases these are privately-owned and maintained on-
site subsurface sewage disposal systems consisting of a
septic tank and a leaching field that treat wastewater
flows, generally of less than 10,000 gallons per day.11
Septic systems that are not properly located and main-
tained can release pathogens and nutrients into surface
and ground waters, endangering drinking water
supplies and wildlife habitat, and their regulation is
widely recognized as an important and legitimate
function of government. But the challenge of support-
ing sustainable new development in communities
without adequate water and sewer infrastructure is
one of the most daunting planning challenges the
region faces.
Title 5 (aka Title V) of the State Environmental Code,12
establishes minimum requirements governing the
construction and maintenance of all septic systems, but
many communities have adopted standards that are
more restrictive than those established by the state.
Title 5, which is administered locally by Boards of
Health, establishes minimum lot size requirements,
soil suitability, percolation rate, depth to groundwater,
and other standards for septic systems. One of the
major barriers to encouraging compact development in
unsewered areas has been the requirement of 10,000
square feet of land per bedroom (a one acre lot for a
four bedroom house). The Massachusetts Department
of Environmental Protection has approved a number 
of innovative alternative (I/A) technologies for on-site
sewage disposal systems that offer several advantages
over conventional septic,13 but many communities do
not allow their use. Many also prohibit shared systems,
a restriction that can render large parcels undevel-
opable even though portions of the site may be well
suited to development. 
All of the towns covered by the Greater Boston Hous-
ing Report Card that are not served by the MWRA
were surveyed by the Pioneer Institute14 in 2004 to
ascertain, among other things, what percent of their
homes were on public sewer systems. The results are
summarized in Table 3.3. Forty-two of the towns in
Greater Boston have no public sewer system; another
17 have sewer systems that serve fewer than 25 percent
of the homes in the community. These municipalities
are shown on Map 3.1.
We also reviewed data from more than 45 major metro-
politan areas to ascertain how unique this region was
in its dependence on septic for waste water disposal. 
A related concern was the Boston metro area’s depend-
ence on individual wells for drinking water, and how
these two together affected building densities and lot
size requirements. Table 3.4 reveals the striking results.
The source of Table 3.4 is the American Housing Survey
(AHS),15 the largest regular national housing sample
survey in the United States. The data for Boston and a
number of other metro areas is nearly a decade old at
this point. Nonetheless, we are presenting it here
because we believe it provides a valid comparison.
Earlier versions of the AHS, the 2000 Census, and
current surveys by trade associations 
such as the National Association of Homebuilders 
and their local affiliates support the conclusion that 
if a metro area relied heavily on septic and wells in 
1990, 1993, 1998, and 2000, it was likely to be heavily
dependent on them in 2007. As Table 3.4 illustrates,
Boston is more dependent on septic than any other
large metro area with the exception of Providence,
Rhode Island and Birmingham, Alabama. And 
because septic systems are land intensive, it comes 
as no surprise that Greater Boston exhibits one of the
largest average lot sizes among major metro areas. 
There is a direct correlation between dependence on
septic and lot size. Massachusetts and its municipali-
ties will need to commit to finding safe and effective
solutions to wastewater disposal in unsewered areas—
if indeed those areas are otherwise appropriate for
TABLE 3.3
Percent of Homes Served by Public Sewer 
in Non-MWRA Communities 
No houses on sewer 44.2%





Source: Pioneer Institute, 2004 Survey
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TABLE 3.4
Lot Size and Reliance on Septic and Wells by Metro Area 
Median lot size (in acres)
Metro Area AHS Year Single FamilyStructures percent wells percent septic
Anaheim 2002 0.16 0.0% 0.0%
Atlanta 2004 0.58 2.0% 17.9%
Baltimore-Towson 1998 0.37 19.1% 18.2%
Birmingham-Hoover 1998 0.84 2.8% 48.8%
Boston 1998 0.98 7.3% 48.6%
Buffalo-Niagara Falls 2002 0.71 10.4% 29.1%
Charlotte 2002 0.44 11.3% 14.7%
Chicago 2003 0.26 9.3% 8.0%
Cincinnati-Middletown 1998 0.48 1.6% 16.1%
Cleveland 2004 0.48 25.6% 27.8%
Columbus 2002 0.34 9.1% 12.1%
Dallas 2002 0.23 0.0% 6.3%
Denver 2004 0.22 2.4% 5.7%
Detroit-Warren-Livonia 2003 0.24 22.2% 21.6%
Distict of Columbia 1998 0.30 8.6% 12.3%
Hartford-West Hartford-East Hartford 2004 1.81 36.4% 41.1%
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown 1998 0.25 8.4% 14.5%
Indianapolis-Carmel 2004 0.34 5.6% 10.0%
Kansas City 2002 0.28 0.0% 4.7%
Los Angeles 2003 NA 0.0% 0.0%
Memphis 2004 0.43 5.5% 12.7%
Miami 2002 0.21 3.1% 4.1%
Milwaukee-Waukesha-West Allis 2002 0.79 24.0% 22.4%
Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington 1998 0.41 22.7% 23.5%
New Orleans 2004 0.19 18.3% 20.6%
Northern NJ 2003 NA 0.0% 4.0%
NY (Nassau, Suffolk, Orange Counties) 2003 NA 7.3% 13.8%
Oklahoma City 2004 0.37 20.6% 30.1%
Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington 2003 0.64 9.5% 22.1%
Phoenix-Mesa-Scottsdale 2002 0.21 1.2% 4.4%
Pittsburgh 2004 0.68 18.3% 24.2%
Portland-Vancouver-Beaverton 2002 0.19 4.9% 11.6%
Providence-Fall River-Warwick 1998 0.81 21.1% 57.9%
Riverside-San Bernadino 2002 0.22 0.3% 9.1%
Rochester 1998 0.69 9.4% 26.0%
Sacramento--Arden-Arcade--Roseville 2004 0.21 3.7% 6.7%
Salt Lake City 1998 0.36 0.9% 2.8%
San Antonio 2004 0.23 5.3% 14.9%
San Diego 2002 0.26 2.1% 5.5%
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont 1998 0.18 0.0% 0.0%
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara 1998 0.17 0.0% 1.9%
Seattle 2004 0.21 3.9% 16.1%
St. Louis 2004 0.38 4.5% 15.8%
Tampa-St. Petersburg-Clearwater 1998 0.23 8.1% 14.3%
Virginia Beach-Norfolk-Newport News 1998 0.46 14.3% 17.9%
Source: U.S. Census Bureau American Housing Survey, various years
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higher density development—or incur the cost of
installing sewers in more locations. 
Targeted Markets
The sponsors and authors of the 2000 New Paradigm
report established production goals for two specific
target markets in addition to an overall market produc-
tion goal: student housing and affordable housing.
Affordable housing was defined as subsidized and
income restricted to occupancy by low-income 
households.
Student Housing 
Higher education is one of Greater Boston’s major
industries, and the area’s colleges and universities
have a tremendous—and largely positive—impact on
the economic, cultural, social, and intellectual life of
the region. The presence of large numbers of college
students competing for housing in the private market,
however, can present special challenges to their host
neighborhoods. The City of Boston alone is home to
more than 62,000 full-time undergraduates, and the
colleges and universities attended by these students
provide on campus housing for less than one half of
their student bodies. 
The impact of students living off campus, competing
with non-students for a limited supply of affordable
rental housing was an especially critical concern
between 1997 and 2001 when Boston had the tightest
rental market in the nation. Over the past decade,
colleges and universities in Boston and Cambridge
have built new dormitories to accommodate nearly
4,000 students, the equivalent of freeing up 1,000 apart-
ment units, and it is widely believed that this produc-
tion helped ease the region’s rental crunch as they came
on line beginning in 2001. Additional student housing
was built on campuses elsewhere in the region.
Student housing production in the high impact areas 
of Boston, Cambridge, and Medford began to pick up
again in 2005. In 2006 and the first quarter of 2007,
construction commenced on student housing for more
than 3,200 undergraduate and graduate students, the
equivalent of 812 new apartments.16 This includes large
undergraduate facilities at Boston University and
Northeastern and graduate student housing at MIT in
Cambridge. Even Boston’s smaller colleges, Emerson
and Suffolk, added new units through new construc-
tion and the acquisition and/or conversion of non-
residential properties. Figure 3.2, which tracks the
production of student housing by building permit
year, illustrates the substantial increase in the high
impact areas from 233 units in 2004 to 453 units in 
2005 to 812 units in 2006.
The student housing pipeline remains strong. Harvard,
Northeastern, Boston University, Boston College, and
Berklee College of Music all have proposals on the
drawing boards, and the Boston Redevelopment
Authority is currently reviewing the city’s first
proposal for new private (non-university-affiliated)
student housing in the Fenway.
Affordable Subsidized Housing 
Affordable housing production, including rehabilita-
tion and preservation efforts, is addressed in detail in
Section 5, but Table 3.5 summarizes the progress made
in 2006 in adding affordable units to the State’s Subsi-
dized Housing Inventory (SHI, or the “40B” list). 
New developments begun in 2006, with an affordable
component,17 created more than 5,000 new units of








Other Student Housing Units




New Student Housing by Year Permitted 
Source: Data provided by individual schools and universities
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units. They will result in the addition of 3,665 units to
the SHI. Nearly half will serve low-income households;
68 percent of the income restricted units will be rental
and 32 percent will be homeownership. While afford-
able housing production was down in 2006, the drop
was not as great as that experienced in market rate
production.
Construction Costs Continue to Rise, 
but at a Slower Rate
Despite the drop off in housing starts, the cost of
construction continued to rise in 2006, though not 
as rapidly as in 2004 and 2005. Rising fuel costs were
identified as a significant factor in the increased cost 
of doing business in 2006. The R.S. Means Company
produces a cost index (Figure 3.3) that measures
change in construction costs over time and in different
parts of the country. The index includes labor and
material, but not land or other peripheral expenses
such as architectural or engineering fees. Figure 3.3
shows that the Boston metropolitan area’s 2006 cost
increase of 6.3 percent was greater than the 5.6 percent
reported for the 30-city average. In 2005 and 2004
Boston had posted increases somewhat lower than 
the average, but the region remains a high cost area
with construction costs generally about 15 percent
above the national average.
The Housing Pipeline
Rising construction costs, unexceptional job growth,
waning consumer confidence, and an overhang of
unsold inventory—more existing than new—have
curtailed plans for additional large-scale development
in the near term. There have not been any major 
new additions to the pipeline in the past 18 months,
although some of the existing projects have made
progress securing approvals and/or financing.
19
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FIGURE 3.3
Historical Construction Costs, 
Boston v. National 30-City Average 
Source: R.S. Means Historical Construction Cost Index
TABLE 3.5
New Affordable Housing Production in Greater Boston
Units that
count on
New New Affordable New Affordable Subsidized
Affordable Homeowner Homeowner Rental Rental Inventory
Year Units Units Units Units Units (40B list)
2002 1,427 815 246 1,681 1,181 1,927
2003 1,889 1,512 510 2,758 1,379 3,268
2004 1,997 2,006 638 3,160 1,359 3,798
2005 2,508 3,095 1,205 2,931 1,303 4,119
2006 2,422 2,124 775 2,890 1,647 3,665
Source: CURP analysis of DHCD, MassHousing, MassDevelopment, MHP, and MHIC reports and data provided by municipalities
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Nonetheless, the housing pipeline remains strong. 
The development permitting process is so arduous in
Massachusetts that those developers who have learned
how to navigate the system and have the financial
wherewithal to do so are willing to wait out the 
market downturn.
CURP is tracking nearly 24,000 units within the 40B
pipeline in Greater Boston communities, 4,000 (15
percent) fewer than what was reported two years ago.
The reduction is due to several factors: a substantial
backlog of 40B developments that commenced
construction in 2005 and 2006; the decline in the
number of new proposals entering the pipeline by 20
percent in 2005 and another 40 percent in 2006; and
1,500 units that had been seeking approval as 40Bs
have moved into the 40R queue. (Chapter 40R is the
Smart Growth Zoning statute enacted in 2004, an
update on which is included in Section 6.)
Major market rate developments have been proposed
that could add more than 20,000 new housing units,
nearly half of them in the City of Boston. Most of 
these are for multifamily development in urban areas
or along transit corridors. Not included in this number
are more than 9,000 units of age restricted housing,
which—like the 40B pipeline—is concentrated in 
the suburbs.
While the production pipeline remains robust, history
suggests that only about 60 percent of it is likely to
get built. Even with the “expedited permitting”
provided under Chapter 40B or the financial incen-
tives attached to Chapter 40R, the permitting process
can take several years to traverse. This is as true in
the cities as it is in the suburbs, and the process is
even more protracted for those developing low-
income housing because they must weave together
a complex web of financial subsidies.
Because the process is so arduous, those with a coveted
site—especially one with approvals in place—are likely
to try to wait out the current market uncertainty. A few
developers, in fact, are aggressively pushing forward
in the hope that they will be bringing desirable new
product to the market just as the economy rebounds
and demand picks up again.
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Last year’s Report Card noted that rents and home
prices in Greater Boston rose in tandem between 1998
and 2001 but diverged sharply after the economy
began to decline in early 2001, with rents moderating
while home prices continued to escalate. By the end 
of 2005, the situation had reversed: rents had begun 
to creep up and home prices were falling. Rent levels
and vacancies remained relatively stable in 2006 and
through the first half of 2007, but home sales and
prices have continued to decline. Current data are
sending mixed signals. Analysts do not agree on 
where the market is headed, though there is emerging
consensus that house prices will continue to slide but
not as steeply as in the past. Of course, what happens
in the “for sale” side of the housing market affects
what happens in the rental market. This section reports
on changes in rents, home prices, sales activity, and
affordability in the past year and a half. 
On one topic there is widespread agreement: the chal-
lenge of affordability in the high cost Boston market
will remain regardless of how quickly the market
recovers. Table 4.1, from the Census Bureau’s most
recent (2005) American Community Survey, illustrates
Massachusetts’ comparative ranking among the 50
states on a range of relevant indicators.18
Greater Boston: A High Cost but Stable
Rental Market
CURP analysis of the region’s rental market is derived
from two primary sources, one focusing on historical
and existing rents and vacancy levels, the other on
advertised rents:
■ Average rents and vacancies for the region are avail-
able going back to 1990 from Reis, Inc., a national
source of commercial real estate trends and analyt-
ics. Effective rents take into account any concessions
provided by landlords such as a month’s free rent.
The data are based on quarterly surveys of profes-
sionally managed apartment complexes of 40 or
more units throughout the metro area and provide 
a good historical overview of the market.
■ Median advertised rents for two-bedroom apart-
ments in 15 Boston neighborhoods and 25 surround-
ing communities are compiled by the City of
Boston’s Department of Neighborhood Develop-
ment (DND) from The Boston Sunday Globe real
estate section. Advertised rents only relate to units
new to the market or to units that are changing
hands, but permit us to observe what is happening
4.
Rents, Home Prices, and Affordability
TABLE 4.1 
How Massachusetts Ranks on Key Housing Indicators, 2005
Category Amount Rank
Median value for owner occupied homes $361,500 3
Median monthly housing cost for owner occupied units with mortgage $1,781 3
Median monthly housing cost (gross rent) for renter occupied units $902 4
Median contract rent $799 4
Percent of mortgaged households spending 30 percent or more on housing 37.3% 9
Percent of renter households spending 30 percent or more on housing 46.4% 9
Home price to income ratio 6.32 3
Mortgage payment to gross rent ratio 1.97 6
Median income homeowner households $79,234 4
Median income renter households $31,820 11
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2005
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to rents across 20 individual towns and cities in the
immediate Boston area.19
Figure 4.1 tracks rental vacancy rates in the Boston
metro area and the nation as a whole and demonstrates
that, even in recovery, Boston’s rental vacancy rates
remain well below national levels. Not since 1990-1992
have rental vacancy rates in Boston been close to the
national rate. In 2006, the Census Bureau estimated
that the average vacancy rate in the Boston metropoli-
tan area was 5.3 percent. This represented a slight
increase from 2005’s annual average rate of 5.1 percent
but was below the 6 percent reached in 2004. Vacancies
jumped in the first quarter of 2007 to 6 percent before
dropping back to 4.2 percent in the second quarter.
This compares with a second quarter rate of 9.5 percent
for the country as a whole.
The Trend in Greater Boston Rents: Reis, Inc. 
Reis reports that the average rental vacancy rate for 
the Boston metro area has been dropping—though
modestly—since 2004, from 5.2 percent that year to 5.1
percent in 2005 to 5.0 percent in 2006. Like the Census
survey, Reis notes an increase in vacancies at year end
2006 and in the first quarter of 2007, a trend it attributes
to the continued growth of the region’s rental inven-
tory. CURP estimates that more than 4,600 new rental
units were completed during 2006 offering a range 
of amenities for those able to spend upwards of
$20,000-$25,000 per year in rent. Examples of recently
completed rental communities include Stonegate on 
the Marlborough/Southborough line in the 495 growth
corridor; Archstone Boston Common in Boston’s China-
town neighborhood and the Trilogy in the Fenway;
Alterra at Overlook Ridge, built on the site of an aban-
doned quarry on the Revere/Malden line; Jefferson at
Dedham Station, near that town’s commuter rail termi-
nal; and the Apartments at Boott Mills and Washington
Mills, adaptive reuse projects in Lowell and Lawrence.
A similar number is expected to be completed in 2007.
Despite the increases in rental production and vacancy
rates near normal levels, the Reis asking price index
increased by 4.1 percent in 2006 to $1,644 compared
with 2005, and the effective rent rose by 4.5 percent to
$1,565. By the second quarter of 2007 asking rents had
climbed to $1,659 with an effective rent of $1,582, both
representing a little better than a 3 percent year over
year increase. From 1994-2001, with vacancy rates never
rising above 3 percent, the asking rent was the effective
rent. Since 2002, however, there has been more room 
for negotiation and effective rents have generally been
about 5 percent below asking rents. For the most part,
though, the incentives are being offered to new tenants
in the recently completed high-end developments, not
in the more affordable “bread and butter” stock. Figure
4.2 documents the changes in asking rents, effective
rents, and vacancy rates since 1990.
Advertised Rents: Boston Globe
While the Reis data provide the historical context, the
City of Boston’s Department of Neighborhood Devel-
opment’s (DND) survey of advertised rents in The
Boston Sunday Globe provides a reasonable indicator 
of market conditions faced by those currently seeking
to rent an apartment. All of the communities in the
survey experienced sharp increases in asking rents
FIGURE 4.1


































Source: U.S. Census Bureau Quarterly Vacancy Survey
Figure 4.1 demonstrates that there has been a general
upward trend in national vacancy rates between 1996
and 2007, but a slightly downward trend in Greater
Boston. That the region’s rental vacancy rates remain
on the low end of a “normal” level of 5.0 to 6.0 percent
helps explain why rents here have not fallen despite
slow population growth and a sluggish job market.
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between 1998 and 2001, before dropping back
modestly since that time. The rent increases in every
case exceeded 20 percent; most were substantially
higher. Three communities saw asking rents jump
more than 50 percent; in nine others, the increase 
was between 30-50 percent. 
Rents fell as the market softened between 2001 and
2004, but the decline was much more modest than the
prior run-up had been, exceeding 15 percent in only
two towns. By 2005 the market had regained some
stability. Some communities began to see rents inch up
in 2006, but others registered modest declines. In 12 of
the 20 for which there was sufficient data in both years,
advertised rents in 2006 were within 5 percent of what
they had been in 2005, and in 17 of the 20 they
remained within 10 percent. 
Table 4.2 documents the changes in Greater Boston’s
rental market between 1998 and 2006 based on adver-
tised rents. In only one municipality, Lexington, was
the asking rent higher in 2006 than it had been in 2001. 
In six of the others, rents were either unchanged from
their 2001 highs or down by less than 10 percent.
Eleven saw asking rents drop by between 10 and 
20 percent.
A similar pattern was evident in the City of Boston’s
neighborhoods. After rising sharply between 1998 
and 2001, asking rents declined but at a much more
modest pace. (See Table 4.3) With the exception of the
already high cost Central (downtown) area, all Boston
neighborhoods witnessed at least a 25 percent increase
in advertised rents between 1998 and 2001, with four
increasing by more than 40 percent. Between 2001 and
2004, the situation reversed: advertised rents dropped
in 13 neighborhoods, while remaining unchanged in
Dorchester. The downtown was again the exception
with advertised rents there rising regardless of the
trend elsewhere. As was the case in the surrounding
communities, the drop in asking rents in Boston was
modest compared to their steep rise over the prior
four years. Also mirroring the experience in the
surrounding communities, rents have vacillated in 
the past two years, with some areas showing greater






















































































































































Historic Apartment Rent and Vacancy Data
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In four Boston neighborhoods asking rents increased
in 2006 over 2005, two remained unchanged, and four
dropped. In every case, though, the change was less
than 10 percent. As Table 4.3 illustrates, 2006 asking
rents in most Boston neighborhoods remain 5 to 16
percent below their 2001 peaks. Running counter to
this trend, however, has been the experience in four of
the City’s priciest rental markets. Asking rents in Back
Bay/Beacon Hill, Central (downtown) Boston, South
End, and Jamaica Plain are now above their 2001
levels, substantially above in the case of Central and
the South End. 
Although there is still considerable variation among
neighborhoods and municipalities, the general decline
in rents experienced between 2001-2004 appears to be
a thing of the past. The renter population grew in 2005
for the first time since 2000, increasing demand for
rental housing. With the uncertainty in the home
TABLE 4.2
Median Advertised Rents for 2-Bedroom Apartments in Boston Area Cities and Towns, 1998-2006
%Change %Change  
City/Town 1998 2001 2004 2005 2006 1998-2001 2001-2006
Arlington $1,100 $1,500 $1,300 $1,250 $1,250 36.4% -16.7%
Belmont $1,225 $1,600 $1,350 $1,350 $1,400 30.6% -12.5%
Brookline $1,400 $1,800 $1,650 $1,838 $1,800 28.6% 0.0%
Cambridge $1,400 $1,750 $1,550 $1,600 $1,575 25.0% -10.0%
Chelsea $1,100 $1,350 $1,195 $1,500 $1,300 22.7% -3.7%
Dedham $1,000 $1,275 $1,100 $1,200 $1,125 27.5% -11.8%
Everett $775 $1,200 $1,100 $975 $1,000 54.8% -16.7%
Framingham $1,075 $1,200
Lexington $1,300 $1,648 $1,600 $1,500 $1,800 26.8% 9.2%
Lynn $1,000 $999
Malden $850 $1,250 $1,175 $1,190 $1,125 47.1% -10.0%
Medford $950 $1,400 $1,200 $1,200 $1,200 47.4% -14.3%
Melrose $950 $1,400 $1,275 $1,295 $1,375 47.4% -1.8%
Needham n/a ** $1,350 $1,475 ** **
Newton $1,300 $1,600 $1,450 $1,400 $1,450 23.1% -9.4%
Quincy $850 $1,250 $1,300 $1,250 $1,250 47.1% 0.0%
Revere $788 $1,288 $1,100 $1,098 $1,195 63.5% -7.2%
Somerville $1,050 $1,400 $1,298 $1,200 $1,250 33.3% -10.7%
Stoneham n/a n/a $1,225 ** $1,125 **
Waltham $975 $1,350 $1,250 $1,200 $1,150 38.5% -14.8%
Watertown $1,200 $1,500 $1,300 $1,250 $1,300 25.0% -13.3%
Winchester $1,050 $1,750 $1,350 $1,373 $1,448 66.7% -17.3%
Winthrop $900 $1,228 $1,200 $1,200 ** 36.4%
Source: The Boston Sunday Globe, compiled by the Department of Neighborhood Development, City of Boston
** Number of cases too small for statistical significance
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buying market, some who could afford to purchase a
home are electing to rent instead. Even with another
4,600 new units scheduled to come on line in 2007, the
rental market for the time being is healthy and well
balanced from the point of view of developers and
landlords. What it is not, and is unlikely to become
anytime soon, is affordable for low and moderate
income households and even many young profession-
als. With rent levels among the highest in the nation,
and vacancies within the normal range, it is unlikely
that rents will drop substantially from their current
high levels.
Rental Affordability
The region’s extraordinary renaissance in rental
production and an unprecedented boom in student
housing construction coupled with a substantial
reduction in the number of renter households—until
2005—did take pressure off the overheated rental
market. As a result, Boston’s rental vacancy rate, the
lowest in the nation in 2000, has risen to near normal
levels. But this has not yet translated into improved
affordability for many renters. The 2005 American
Community Survey reported that the number of renter
households paying more than 30 percent of their
income for rent rose by nearly 9 percent between 2004
and 2005, and the number paying in excess of 50
percent jumped by 36 percent, affirming the anecdotal
evidence that many of the region’s renters are worse
off today than they had been at the market’s peak.
Since most cost burdened tenants are those with the
lowest incomes, they are left with little for other basic
necessities like food, health care and childcare.
In general, renter households have substantially lower
incomes than their home owning counterparts:
$35,748 compared to $81,886 in 2005. They have also
experienced a greater drop in real income in recent
years. As a result, an increasing supply of apartments
TABLE 4.3
Median Advertised Rents for 2-Bedroom Apartments in City of Boston Neighborhoods, 1998-2006
%Change %Change  
Neighborhood 1998 2001 2004 2005 2006 1998-2001 2001-2006
Allston/Brighton $1,200 $1,500 $1,300 $1,300 $1,300 25.0% -13.3%
Back Bay/ Beacon Hill $1,900 $2,400 $2,250 $2,450 $2,600 26.3% 8.3%
Central $2,200 $1,875 $2,200 $2,200 $2,300 -14.8% 22.7%
Charlestown  $1,400 $1,925 $1,650 $1,550 $1,650 37.5% -14.3%
Dorchester  $800 $1,295 $1,300 $1,200 $1,200 61.9% -7.3%
East Boston ** $1,200 $1,100 $1,100 $1,200 ** 0.0%
Fenway/Kenmore  $1,350 $1,900 $1,498 $1,225 $1,598 40.7% -15.9%
Hyde Park  $850 $1,275 $1,250 $1,200 $1,200 50.0% -5.9%
Jamaica Plain  $1,100 $1,400 $1,325 $1,400 $1,525 27.3% 8.9%
Mattapan  ** $1,250 $1,200 $1,200 $1,100 ** -12.0%
Roslindale  $900 $1,300 $1,225 $1,225 $1,200 44.4% -7.7%
Roxbury  ** $1,300 $1,250 $1,200 $895 ** **
South Boston  $1,200 $1,500 $1,400 $1,400 $1,300 25.0% -13.3%
South End  $1,500 $2,000 $1,950 $2,200 $2,350 33.3% 17.5%
West Roxbury $1,000 $1,400 $1,225 $1,250 $1,200 40.0% -14.3%
Source: The Boston Sunday Globe, compiled by the Department of Neighborhood Development, City of Boston
** Number of cases too small for statistical significance
with asking prices in excess of $1,500 per month is 
of little benefit to them. The high quality new rental
production does provide an attractive option to those
renter households who can afford it, and 30 percent 
of the region’s renters can afford a monthly rent of 
at least $1,500. Increasingly, it is also providing a
competitive alternative for older homeowners 
who wish to downsize. 
The squeeze comes for those low-income renters left
to fend for themselves in a marketplace with increas-
ingly fewer low cost options. Figure 4.3 illustrates the
shifting cost profile of the region’s rental inventory,
from 2000 to the present, including asking rent levels
of units currently vacant and available for rent. Nearly
two out of five (38.6%) of the region’s renter house-
holds can afford to pay a monthly rent of no more
than $625. The 2005 ACS reports that just 25 percent 
of the available units are so priced. New construction
requires a rent at least twice that amount, and often
much more. 
Not surprising, in its most recent annual assessment of
least affordable rental markets, Out of Reach 2006, the
National Low Income Housing Coalition (NLIHC)
ranked Massachusetts 3rd, after Hawaii and Califor-
nia. The Commonwealth has held one of the top four
positions since 2000. The Boston-Cambridge-Quincy
metro area ranked 6th. (It has ranked between 5th and
7th since 2000.) 
In the Boston metro area,20 the fair market rent (FMR)
recognized by the federal Department of Housing and

































































































































Erosion of Low-Cost Rentals 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 Decennial Census and the 2005 American Community Survey
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Urban Development (HUD) for a two-bedroom apart-
ment is $1,366. In order to afford this level of rent and
utilities, without spending more than 30 percent of its
income, a household must earn $54,640 annually.
Assuming a 40-hour work week, 52 weeks a year, a
worker needs to earn $22.65 an hour to afford the
FMR for a two-bedroom home. This is called the
“housing wage.”
Since a Massachusetts worker earning the minimum
wage makes $6.75 an hour, (s)he must work 134 hours
a week, 52 weeks a year, in order to afford the FMR 
for a two-bedroom apartment. Alternatively, she could
afford the rent if she shared expenses with 2.4 other
full time workers, each earning the minimum wage.
Moving up the economic ladder, the estimated average
hourly wage for a renter in Massachusetts in 2006 was
$15.68. Even at this amount, a worker would need to
work 58 hours a week, year round, to afford a two-
bedroom apartment. 
A Growing National Concern: Affordable Rental
Housing for Very Low-income Households
While Boston is noteworthy for its extremely high rent
levels,21 the challenge of housing affordability for the
lowest income Americans is a national problem that
traces its roots, in large part, to income stagnation
among low, moderate, and even middle income work-
ers and to changes made to the tax code 20 years ago
that made investment in real estate relatively less
attractive than other investments. The most pressing
rental “deficit,” or shortfall, now exists for extremely
low-income renters, those earning 30 percent or less
of the area median income, as several national studies
have documented recently. In Greater Boston, a three-
person household earning less than $22,750 annually
is considered extremely low income, as is a four-
person household earning less than $25,250. 
The National Low Income Housing Coalition reports
that, even if every existing affordable rental unit in the
country housed an extremely low-income household,
there would still be a shortfall of 2.8 million units.
And, the gap between the demand and the supply 
of housing for those with extremely low incomes is
growing. Meanwhile, the rental housing market facing
households at 80 percent of the area median income is
fairly well balanced nationwide, with many areas
registering a surplus of affordable units. 
Continued Weakness in the 
Home Buying Market 
On the homeownership side, the number of home
sales in the region is still declining, but not at the rates
experienced a year ago. Single family home sales in
Massachusetts fell 14.5 percent in the fourth quarter 
of 2006, but rose in the first quarter of 2007 by 2.8
percent before retreating again in the second quarter
with a 5.4 percent drop. (Change is measured over the
same quarter a year earlier.) As Table 1.1 in Section 1
illustrated, the state has experienced declining sales 
in seven of the past eight quarters. Home prices, 
too, have fallen in each of the last six quarters, most
recently dropping by 1.4 percent in the second quarter
of 2007. The weakest performance to date was regis-
tered in the third quarter of 2006 when sales were
down by 23.4 percent from the prior year, and the
median price of single family homes sold was 4.9
percent lower than it had been during the same 
period a year earlier. 
Industry analysts consider the Massachusetts market
to be at equilibrium for buyers and sellers when 7.5 to
8.5 months of housing supply exists. Table 4.4, which
presents a snapshot of key market indicators for a
single month—June—from 2004-2007, documents the
softening market. Data are provided by the Massachu-
setts Association of Realtors and are for the whole
state. Both single family homes and condominiums
show similar trends: the number of listings and
months of supply rose for three years before dropping
back somewhat in 2007; the number of days on the
market has continued to rise; the number of sales
continues to drop as does the median single family
home price. The median condominium price rose in
2007, but this may be the result of more newly
constructed units in the mix, not an increase in the
price of existing homes. 
According to the Warren Group, publishers of Banker
and Tradesman, single family sales in Greater Boston22
through June 2007 were down 2.3 percent compared 
to a year earlier, while the median price dropped 2.8
percent, to $371,000. Condominium sales were down
as well, by 2.9 percent, with a drop in the median price
of 1.7 percent to $297,000. Figure 4.4 documents these
trends. Sales of 2-4 family dwellings fared even worse.
Fueled by the condominium conversion frenzy that
began in 2003, sales of these small multifamily proper-
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ties rose to all time highs in 2004, with prices peaking 
a year later. Through June 2007, 2-4 family sales are
down nearly 40 percent statewide, with an 8.1 percent
drop in median price. It is estimated that 2007 sales 
are likely to be 46 percent below the 2004 mark. 
The companion Figure 4.5 illustrates the year over year
percentage change in the median single family home
price from 1988 on. From 1989 to 1992 housing prices
declined for three years in a row as the economy fell
into recession, losing about 14 percent of their nominal
value. During the more recent recession (2001), and
subsequent period of anemic economic growth, 
price appreciation remained positive. That has now
changed, and the region has experienced back-to-back
price declines of 4.3 percent in 2006 and 3.9 percent
through the first five months of 2007.
The National Perspective
The nation continued to experience double digit 
housing price appreciation for a full year after the
Boston and Massachusetts housing markets had begun
to cool, as Figure 4.6 illustrates. This figure compares
home price appreciation in the Boston metro area to
the nation as a whole. While the Commonwealth has
enjoyed the highest rate of price appreciation of all 
50 states when viewed over a 27-year perspective
(since 1980)—and Boston has likewise held the same
distinction among metro areas—much of that increase
was driven by the spectacular run-up in prices in the
mid-1980s, increases that were off a relatively low 1980
baseline that closely resembled the national average in
terms of median home price. Many other states have
experienced greater price appreciation in recent years,
including Nevada, California, Arizona, and Florida. 
All of these states are now experiencing price correc-
tions, and some are likely to see prices tumble more
dramatically than Massachusetts in 2007 and 2008. 
For the five years ending March 31, 2007, Massachu-
setts experienced a 44 percent appreciation in housing
prices, ranking 26th among the states and lagging the
U.S. rate of 54 percent. During the same period, Florida
experienced price appreciation of 102 percent, Califor-
nia 99 percent, Nevada and Maryland 96 percent,
Arizona 94 percent, Rhode Island 76 percent, and New
Jersey 74 percent. 
Unlike parts of the country that experienced unbridled
overbuilding, Greater Boston does not have a substan-
TABLE 4.4
Snapshot of a Housing Market in Transition
Avg
Single Supply # of Median Listing
Family in % # of % SF Homes % Sales % Time %
Homes Months Change Listings Change Sold Change Price Change (days) Change
Jun-04 5.0 -18.0% 29,712 -4.5% 6,051 24.7% $360,000 12.8% NA NA
Jun-05 5.9 18.0% 35,820 20.6% 6,115 1.1% $373,750 3.8% 84 NA
Jun-06 7.6 28.8% 38,664 7.9% 5,105 -16.5% $370,000 -1.0% 111 32.1%
Jun-07 7.7 1.3% 38,018 -1.7% 4,959 -2.9% $364,000 -1.6% 126 13.5%
Avg
Supply # of Median Listing
in % # of % Condos % Sales % Time %
Condominiums Months Change Listings Change Sold Change Price Change (days) Change
Jun-04 5.0 -20.6% 11,662 12.7% 2,329 44.5% $265,000 12.8% NA NA
Jun-05 5.5 10.0% 15,362 31.7% 2,781 19.4% $286,750 8.2% 66 NA
Jun-06 7.5 36.4% 17,830 16.1% 2,382 -14.3% $283,500 -1.1% 98 48.5%
Jun-07 7.2 -4.0% 16,999 -4.7% 2,352 -1.3% $296,000 4.4% 124 26.5%
Source: Massachusetts Association of Realtors Monthly Reports
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FIGURE 4.4
Number of Sales and Median Price of Single Family Homes and Condominiums
Source: The Warren Group Publications



































































# Condominium Sales# Single Family Sales
FIGURE 4.5
Year-Over-Year Change in Median 








































































Source: The Warren Group Publications
* 2007 change is Jan-June median price change from year-end 2006
FIGURE 4.6
Home Price Index 





































Source: Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight House Price Index
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tial unsold inventory of newly built homes. What the
region is encountering is a standoff between anxious
would-be buyers, who think the market may drop
further, and would-be sellers with inflated expecta-
tions of their property’s value, not a glut of new homes
caused by overbuilding. New construction constitutes
only about 10 percent of the home sales in any given
year in Massachusetts, compared to 13-15 percent
nationally. Still, the current slowdown is affecting the
state’s homebuilders. Much of the recent production
has been targeted to empty nesters, and in many cases,
restricted to households with at least one member over
age 55. Units in this market segment cannot move
unless potential buyers can sell their existing homes. 
For most of the Commonwealth’s long term owners,
the recent downturn in the market is unlikely to erode
the substantial gains they have enjoyed over the term
of their ownership, but the psychological impact is
enormous. Many homeowners, who had contemplated
selling, are unwilling to lower their asking price
because they believe their property is worth what 
similar properties fetched in the summer of 2005.
Rather than reduce their asking price, they may take
the house off the market or let it languish with an 
unattainable price tag. 
Home Prices and Sales Fall as Inventories Rise
Homeowner vacancy rates fluctuate more than rental
rates do, but typically increasing vacancy rates and
rising inventories are harbingers of falling prices. Two
figures illustrate these trends. Figure 4.7, which tracks
homeowner vacancy rates in the Boston metro area
against national norms, shows that the region’s sliding
home sales corresponded to rising vacancy rates,
beginning in the third quarter of 2005. Boston’s home-
owner vacancy rate, like its rental vacancy rate, still
remains well below national norms and this helps 
to explain why recent price declines have been quite
modest. Not since 1994 has the Greater Boston home-
owner vacancy rate come close to the national rate.
Figure 4.8 tracks the number of listings of homes for
sale in Massachusetts over the past decade. This figure
underscores the seasonal nature of the home sales
market, but the trends are apparent: as inventories fell,
prices rose; when inventories began to rise, prices soft-
ened. This figure includes both single family dwellings
and condominiums.
Homeownership Affordability
That Boston was the third most expensive home
buying market in the nation in 2001, and now ranks
#15, is scant comfort to those who wish to purchase a
home here. Affordability did improve modestly in 2006
as falling prices more than offset rising interest rates,
but future interest rate increases could easily reverse
these gains.
The median price of single family homes sold in 2006
ranged from $243,950 in Lawrence to $1.2 million in
Weston. Prices were down in more than 80 percent
(130) of the communities tracked by the Housing
Report Card compared to 2005. They rose in 16 percent
(26), and were unchanged in 3 percent (5). This repre-
sented a stunning turnaround from 2004 and 2005
when median home prices increased year over year in
more than 90 percent of the region’s municipalities. In
50 percent of the communities, the 2006 price decline
ranged from 0.8 percent to 7.4 percent. The median
price of single family homes sold through the first 
five months of 2007 exhibited a similar pattern. Prices
were down from the 2006 (full year) level in 80 percent
of the communities and up in only 20 percent. The
median price is the mid point, the price at which half
the sales are more expensive and half are less. Changes
FIGURE 4.7
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in median price are as likely to be caused by variation
in the mix of homes sold as they are by market condi-
tions, but the fact that price declines are as widespread
as they are certainly points to a deteriorating market. 
Table 4.5 provides further evidence that 2006 was the
year that the Boston market shifted gears. In 1998, the
median price of a home was less than $300,000 in 136
Greater Boston cities and towns. That number dropped
every year through 2005, when the median single
family home sold for less than $300,000 in only seven
municipalities—less than 5 percent of the region’s 
161 communities. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the number of communities with median single family
home prices above $500,000 increased during the same
period, from 4 to 43, including four where the median
price topped $1,000,000 in 2005.
With home prices declining in 2006, the number of
communities with a median single family sales price 
of less than $300,000 doubled from 7 to 14. Even with
this improvement, however, fewer than 9 percent 
of the 161 Greater Boston communities had median 
selling prices under $300,000, so while housing afford-
ability improved, it did not improve by very much. In
2006, just one town could boast a median home price
in excess of $1,000,000, down from four the year before. 
Affordability Gap Analysis
To better understand the affordability problem, CURP
prepares annually a town by town “affordability gap”
analysis. The analysis estimates the number of commu-
nities that would be affordable to their existing residents
if those residents were attempting to purchase a home
there at current prices. A municipality’s housing is
considered “affordable” for this analysis if the annual
cost of supporting a mortgage, real estate taxes, and
homeowner’s insurance does not exceed one-third 
of the annual median income of households in that
community. CURP also estimates the affordability 
gap for those unable to come up with a 20 percent
down payment. Considered a “first time homebuyer”
analysis, the calculation is the same but both the 
homebuyer’s household income and the purchase
price of the home are estimated to be just 80 percent 
of the median for the community and the down
payment is assumed to be 10 percent with private
mortgage insurance.
The number of communities where the median single
family home would be affordable to a family earning
that municipality’s median household income
increased in 2006 and again through the first five
months of 2007, to 30 and 46 respectively, after having
FIGURE 4.8
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dropped from 148 municipalities in 1998 to just 19 in
2005. Affordability for first-time homebuyers increased
as well in 2006 and 2007, and now six communities
could be so considered. But even with this improve-
ment, the number of communities considered afford-
able today is a far cry from the 92 percent that were
deemed affordable by this analysis in 1998. Table 4.6
summarizes the findings of this year’s affordability
gap analysis. The detailed listing and methodology 
are included in Appendix A.
This year, for the first time, CURP is able to show the
price distribution of homes sold, an important comple-
ment to the municipality-by-municipality median
prices. Shrewsbury-based MLS Property Information
Network (MLSPIN), the largest multiple listing service
in New England, provided the Report Card with valu-
able new information about the distribution of homes
sold in 2006 and those currently on the market (July
2007) in the 161 cities and towns covered by the Report
Card. Viewed together, Figure 4.9 and Table 4.7 show
what share of the homes sold last year were affordable
to different income groups. Sixty percent of the homes
sold in 2006 in the 161 Greater Boston communities
were priced below $400,000; nearly half sold for under
$350,000. The homes priced under $400,000 were
evenly split between condos and single family resi-
TABLE 4.5
Home Price Distribution, 1998-2006
# of Communities with Median 
Single-Family Sales Price 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Below $100,000 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
$100,000 - $199,999 82 41 14 5 0 0 0 0
$200,000 - $299,999 50 68 74 62 43 19 7 14
$300,000 - $399,999 16 32 42 52 61 74 71 74
$400,000 - $499,999 4 10 12 22 30 33 40 36
$500,000 - $999,999 4 9 18 19 25 35 39 36
$1,000,000 and Above 0 0 0 0 1 1 4 1
% of Communities with Median 
Single-Family Sales Price 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Below $100,000 2.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
$100,000 - $199,999 51.3% 25.6% 8.8% 3.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
$200,000 - $299,999 31.3% 42.5% 46.3% 38.8% 26.9% 11.9% 4.4% 8.8%
$300,000 - $399,999 10.0% 20.0% 26.3% 32.5% 38.1% 46.3% 44.4% 46.3%
$400,000 - $499,999 2.5% 6.3% 7.5% 13.8% 18.8% 20.6% 25.0% 22.5%
$500,000 - $999,999 2.5% 5.6% 11.3% 11.9% 15.6% 21.9% 24.4% 22.5%
$1,000,000 and Above 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 0.6% 2.5% 0.6%
%  of Communities with Median 
Single-Family Sales Price 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Below $300,000 85.0% 68.1% 55.0% 41.9% 26.9% 11.9% 4.4% 8.8%
$300,000 - $499,999 12.5% 26.3% 33.8% 46.3% 56.9% 66.9% 69.4% 68.8%
$500,000 and Above 2.5% 5.6% 11.3% 11.9% 16.3% 22.5% 26.9% 23.1%
Source: The Warren Group Publications
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dences; among those priced below $350,000, the split
was 45 percent single family, 55 percent condomini-
ums. This translates into some 9,000 single family
homes that sold for under $350,000 and 13,000 that
sold for less than $400,000 in 2006. 
Where the number of single family homes drops off
sharply is in the “under $250,000” price range. Just 
22 percent of those sales were single family. Fewer 
than 9 percent of all home sales in 2006, condominium
or single family, were priced below $200,000. Among
current listings (July 2007), just 2 percent (348 homes)
were priced at under $200,000; 16 percent (2,921) were
priced between $200,000 and $299,000; and 27 percent
(4,892) were priced between $300,000 and $399,000.
The companion Table 4.7 provides information on
what share of total home sales in 2006 were at prices
affordable to households of different means. According
to the table, a household with an income of $68,000
would be able to purchase a home with a maximum
selling price of just about $300,000. In 2006, about 31
percent of all homes sold—single family and condo—
were affordable by households with this income or
less. To get some idea of who could afford this hous-
ing, recall from Table 2.2 that the median household
income in 2005 was around $62,400. Assuming the
median income in the region rose at the same rate 
in 2006 as it did in 2005—just 2 percent, to about
$64,000—half the region’s households were in a posi-
tion to afford just 31 percent of the houses. Of course,
for those with incomes below the median, the number
of options was much more limited. Moreover, most of
these households would have had to limit their search
to condos since only about a third (34.7%) of the units
selling for less than $300,000 were single family homes.
TABLE 4.6
Summary of Affordability Gap Analysis
Communities Affordable to Median Communities Affordable to First Time
Income Homebuyer Purchasing Percent Homebuyer Earning 80% of Median Purchasing Percent 
Year Median Priced House (20% downpayment) Affordable House Priced at 80% of Median (10% downpayment) Affordable
1998 148 92% 116 72%
2000 101 63% 87 54%
2001 86 53% 42 26%
2002 77 48% 17 11%
2003 59 37% 5 3%
2004 27 17% 1 <1%
2005 19 12% 0 0%
2006 30 19% 1 <1%
2007* 46 29% 6 4%
Source: The Warren Group Publications
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* data labels indicate price range’s share of total home sales
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How Do Homebuyers in Massachusetts Compare 
to Homebuyers in Other Parts of the Country? 
CURP routinely examines industry surveys and
reports to ascertain if, and how, Massachusetts home-
buyers differ from their counterparts in other parts of
the country, with a particular interest in understanding
how the state’s high prices affect first time home
buyers. The Profile of Home Buyers and Sellers, an
annual survey undertaken by the National Association
of Realtors in cooperation with their state affiliates
including the Massachusetts Association of Realtors,
provides a snapshot of homebuyers in the Bay State
and their national counterparts. The most recent profile
is based on an eight page questionnaire mailed to more
than 4,000 Massachusetts consumers who bought
homes between July 2005 and July 2006. The survey
yielded 205 usable responses, a 5.1 percent response
rate. We now have data from two years (2005 and
2006), and Table 4.8 highlights some of the findings.
The 2006 survey results illustrate that some striking
differences remain between Boston home buyers and
their counterparts in other states. It is noteworthy,
though, that Boston became somewhat more affordable
in 2006, as other regions became less so. The typical
Massachusetts homebuyer in 2005 had an income 23
percent higher than the typical household nationwide,
but (s)he was purchasing a home that was 81 percent
more expensive. A year later in 2006, the Massachu-
setts income premium had fallen to 15 percent, but the
Bay State home price premium had dropped to 52
percent. In 2005, one-third (33%) of homes purchased
nationwide sold for less than $150,000, while only 
4 percent of Massachusetts homes did. In 2006, the
comparable figures were 28 percent nationwide and 
6 percent in Massachusetts. While 52 percent of homes
purchased nationwide sold for less than $200,000 in
2005 compared to only 14 percent in the Common-
wealth, a year later the gap had narrowed to 46 percent
versus 18 percent. 
Even the price premium on newly constructed homes
declined from 2005 to 2006, from 85 percent above the
average national price to 60 percent. First time home-
buyers continue to represent the same proportion of
buyers here as nationwide, and the price premium
TABLE 4.7
Who Could Afford to Purchase a Home in 2006
Approximate Income 
Required Distribution of 2006 Home Sales % of Sales
Low High Price Range Single Family Condominium
$46,000 Under $200K 402 3,078 8.0%
$46,000 $57,000 $200 - $249.9 1,258 2,898 9.6%
$57,000 $68,000 $250 - $299.9 3,077 2,923 13.8%
$68,000 $80,000 $300 - $349.9 4,326 2,424 15.6%
$80,000 $91,000 $350 - $399.9 3,939 1,767 13.2%
$91,000 $102,000 $400 - $449.9 2,705 1,210 9.0%
$102,000 $114,000 $450 - $499.9 2,073 790 6.6%
$114,000 $137,000 $500 - $599.9 2,719 920 8.4%
$137,000 $159,000 $600 - $699.9 1,669 517 5.0%
$159,000 $182,000 $700 - $799.9 1,102 264 3.2%
$182,000 $205,000 $800 - $899.9 728 158 2.0%
$205,000 $228,000 $900 - $999.9 467 100 1.3%
$228,000 $1M and Over 1,538 292 4.2%
Source: CURP analysis of MLS Property Information Network (MLSPIN) data and U.S. Census Bureau American Community Survey 2005
TABLE 4.8
Homebuyer Profile, Massachusetts v. U.S.
2005 2006 Change 05-06
All Home Buyers MA U.S. MA U.S. MA U.S.
Median Income $87,700 $71,600 $82,600 $71,800 -5.8% 0.3%
% with Incomes <$45,000 12% 21% 12% 21% 0.0% 0.0%
% with Incomes <$55,000 19% 32% 19% 31% 0.0% -3.1%
% with Incomes <$75,000 37% 53% 41% 52% 10.8% -1.9%
Median Age 38 40 38 41 0.0% 2.5%
Median Price of Home Purchased $352,000 $195,000 $325,000 $214,000 -7.7% 9.7%
Median Price - New Home $418,500 $226,300 $400,000 $250,000 -4.4% 10.5%
Median Price - Previously Owned Home $344,000 $185,000 $319,900 $200,000 -7.0% 8.1%
Median % Financed 81% 87% 86% 91% 6.2% 4.6%
% Purchasing Homes Price <$150,000 4% 33% 6% 28% 50.0% -15.2%
% Purchasing Homes Price <$200,000 14% 52% 18% 46% 28.6% -11.5%
% Purchasing Newly Constructed Home 11% 23% 11% 22% 0.0% -4.3%
Median Price of a Newly Constructed Home $418,500 $226,300 $400,000 $250,000 -4.4% 10.5%
Of Newly Constructed Home Buyers, % Paying <$200,000 0% 41% 0% 32% * -22.0%
Of Newly Constructed Home Buyers, % Paying <$300,000 25% 70% 16% 62% -36.0% -11.4%
Of Newly Constructed Home Buyers, % Paying >$500,000 32% 9% 37% 13% 15.6% 44.4%
% Purchasing Detached Single Family Home 69% 75% 65% 75% -5.8% 0.0%
% Purchasing Townhouse/Row House 7% 9% 8% 9% 14.3% 0.0%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 2-4 Units 7% 7% 12% 3% 71.4% -57.1%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 5 or More Units 11% 2% 13% 8% 18.2% 300.0%
Size (in Square Feet) 1,767 1,816 1,688 1,815 -4.5% -0.1%
Price per Square Foot by Type of Home $211 $109 $200 $118 -5.2% 8.3%
Detached Single Family $206 $106 $200 $112 -2.9% 5.7%
Townhouse $224 $124 $176 $136 -21.4% 9.7%
Unit in 2-4 Unit Structure $277 $100 $202 $129 -27.1% 29.0%
Unit in Structure with 5 or More Units $252 $163 $224 $189 -11.1% 16.0% 
First Time Home Buyers
First Time Buyers as % of All Home Buyers 43% 40% 45% 36% 4.7% -10.0%
Median Age of First Time Buyers 32 32 32 32 0.0% 0.0%
% < Age 25 5% 14% 7% 12% 40.0% -14.3%
% Between 25-34 63% 50% 66% 51% 4.8% 2.0%
Median Price of Home Purchased $296,000 $150,000 $269,000 $165,000 -9.1% 10.0%
Size (in Square Feet) First Time Homebuyers 1,432 1,546 1,483 1,516 3.6% -1.9%
Median Income $80,200 $57,200 $75,800 $58,300 -5.5% 1.9%
% with Incomes <$45,000 12% 32% 10% 32% -16.7% 0.0%
% with Incomes <$55,000 19% 47% 25% 46% 31.6% -2.1%
% with Incomes <$75,000 27% 16% 47% 70% 74.1% 337.5%
% Purchasing Detached Single Family Home 65% 69% 63% 66% -3.1% -4.3%
% Purchasing Townhouse/Row House 5% 11% 9% 13% 80.0% 18.2%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 2-4 Units 7% 3% 13% 3% 85.7% 0.0%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 5+ Units 16% 9% 13% 11% -18.8% 22.2%
% Purchasing Home Costing < $150,000 5% 49% 5% 44% 0.0% -10.2%
% Purchasing Home Costing < $200,000 22% 68% 22% 64% 0.0% -5.9%
Repeat Home Buyers
Median Price of Home Purchased by Repeat Buyers $405,000 $235,000 $370,000 $249,000 -8.6% 6.0%
Median Income Repeat Buyers $96,700 $83,200 $91,900 $81,900 -5.0% -1.6%
% with Incomes <$45,000 12% 14% 12% 15% 0.0% 7.1%
% with Incomes <$55,000 19% 23% 13% 23% -31.6% 0.0%
% with Incomes <$75,000 34% 42% 32% 43% -5.9% 2.4%
% Over 55 28% 30% 31% 30% 10.7% 0.0%
% Purchasing Detached Single Family Home 72% 79% 66% 80% -8.3% 1.3%
% Purchasing Townhouse/Row House 9% 8% 7% 7% -22.2% -12.5%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 2-4 Units 8% 2% 11% 3% 37.5% 50.0%
% Purchasing Unit in Building with 5 or More Units 8% 5% 13% 6% 62.5% 20.0%
Source: National Association of Realtors
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they paid for their home in 2006 was 63 percent, down
from 97 percent in 2005. Again, none of this suggests
the affordability challenge has been resolved. It does
show that some progress has been made.
Rising Delinquencies and Foreclosures: 
How Great a Risk?
Subprime lending has been in the news a lot during
the past eighteen months. It refers to the extension of
credit to borrowers who are considered “high risk.”
Subprime loans carry higher interest rates, points 
and fees than conventional loans—often substantially
higher—and over the past decade a profitable industry
evolved to originate, service, and finance these loans.
Now, rising delinquency rates and increasing foreclo-
sures in the subprime market nationwide are wreaking
havoc from Main Street to Wall Street. According to 
the most recent quarterly delinquency survey by the
national Mortgage Bankers Association (MBA),23 one
subprime borrower in seven in Massachusetts is at
least 30 days past due on mortgage payments. More
than 6.5 percent are in the process of being foreclosed,
and many more are likely to follow suit when their
adjustable rate mortgages are reset and/or low 
introductory rates expire. 
The Rise of Subprime Lending in Greater Boston
Just a year and a half ago Massachusetts mortgage
delinquencies and foreclosures, while rising, were 
well below the national average. This is illustrated 
in Figure 4.10, which tracks loans that are 90 days or
more past due for the state and for the nation as a
whole. Now the Commonwealth is experiencing 
delinquency and default rates that are higher than 
the national norms and rising at a faster rate. As is
evident from this figure, which reports conventional
prime and subprime loans separately, the problem
exists almost entirely within the subprime market. 
The same MBA survey, which captures an estimated 80
percent of all existing loans, provides a good indication
of the explosive growth in subprime lending in Massa-
chusetts and elsewhere. In the first quarter of 2001, 
just 1.8 percent of Massachusetts conventional loans
included in the survey were subprime. By the end of
2006, 12.4 percent were. This represents nearly a 700
percent increase. By comparison, the number of prime
loans increased by just 28 percent during the same
period. The national trend was similar. Subprime loans
historically have had higher delinquency and default
rates than prime loans, but responsible subprime lend-
ing can benefit borrowers who might not otherwise be
able to access credit. Analysis of recent subprime lend-
ing, however, suggests that much of it would not fall
into the category of responsible lending. 
The Housing Report Card monitors mortgage lending
patterns, delinquencies, and foreclosures using data
from a number of number of sources. The most
comprehensive analysis of lending in the Greater
Boston area, based on Home Mortgage Disclosure 
Act (HMDA) data, is prepared annually by Dr. James
Campen of UMass Boston for the Massachusetts
Community and Banking Council.24 Dr. Campen’s
analysis of lending patterns from 2005, the most recent
year for which data are available, confirms earlier
reports that black and Latino borrowers and neighbor-
hoods are much more likely than their white counter-
parts to receive subprime (higher cost) loans. The
number of home purchase loans to white and Asian
FIGURE 4.10
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borrowers in the City of Boston dropped in 2005, but
loans to black and Latino homebuyers rose sharply,
with almost all of the increase accounted for by
subprime lenders. Subprime lenders made a dispro-
portionate share of their Boston loans to minority
borrowers in the city’s lower-income minority neigh-
borhoods, and they accounted for a disproportionately
large share of all loans made to these borrowers and
neighborhoods. The subprime lenders share of loans 
to low and moderate income borrowers, however, was
considerably smaller than their share of the overall
home purchase mortgage market.25
Overall, subprime lenders accounted for 16.2 percent 
of total home-purchase loans in the 101 Greater Boston
cities and towns for which such data are available,26
but more than one-third of all loans in Everett, Revere,
Chelsea, Randolph, Lynn, and in certain Boston neigh-
borhoods, all communities with substantial percentages
of black and/or Latino households and with relatively
low median family incomes. Because of the increasingly
high levels of default associated with subprime mort-
gages, this clustering is worrisome. The full impact of
the subprime lending problems on the national and
local economies is not yet known, but the effect on 
individual homeowners and communities with high
concentrations of these loans could be devastating. 
The Link Between Subprime Lending and Rising
Foreclosures
In a strong and rising housing market, homeowners
who find themselves unable to meet their mortgage
obligations may be able to sell their home and pay off
the mortgage or refinance under more advantageous
terms. But with home prices dropping, fewer buyers 
in the market, interest rates rising, and underwriting
standards being tightened, many are now likely to 
lose their homes to foreclosure. Compounding the
weakness in the housing market is the fact that many
borrowers who bought at the peak of the market did 
so with mortgage products that required low monthly
payments initially, but which have—or soon will—
increase, in some cases quite dramatically. The result
has been a spike in foreclosures, which are now at 
their highest level in nearly fifteen years.
The first step in the foreclosure process is a lender’s
filing in land court of a petition stating its intent to
foreclose. Of course, not all foreclosure proceedings
result in the homeowner losing his home in a foreclo-
sure sale, but the filing is a widely accepted warning
sign of financial distress on the part of the homeowner.
Figure 4.11 illustrates the dramatic rise in foreclosure
petitions in Greater Boston’s five principal counties
since 2003.
FIGURE 4.11













The 1990-1991 recession precipitated a similar rapid
increase in the number of foreclosures, and many 
of those did result in foreclosure sales. In Boston 
foreclosure sales represented nearly 44 percent of all
homes sales in 1992 and had a detrimental impact on
property values in the neighborhoods in which they
were concentrated. The City’s Department of Neighbor-
hood Development (DND) has been closely monitoring
the current situation, and its findings are disquieting.
After falling to historic lows in 2004, foreclosure sales in
the city have since risen sharply: 60 in 2005, 261 in 2006
and 247 through the first six months of 2007. Meanwhile
foreclosure filings, which had totaled 591 in 2005, and
1,585 in 2006, were up to 1,154 through just the first six
months of 2007. Seventy percent of the 2006 foreclosure
petitions were clustered in Dorchester, Hyde Park,
Mattapan, and Roxbury, low and moderate income
neighborhoods with the largest share of subprime
loans—the type of loan most likely to go into fore-
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closure—and also the neighborhoods with the highest
concentration of black and Latino homeowners. Else-
where in the region, Chelsea, Everett, Randolph, Lynn,
Revere, Lawrence, Brockton, and Lowell also have
high concentrations of subprime loans.
DND27 reported other troubling observations: 
■ The length of time between the initial purchase of
the property and the filing of a foreclosure petition
has been dropping. In 2004, only 13.8 percent of
foreclosed properties had been owned less than 
two years, compared to 40.1 percent in 2006. 
■ In 2004, 33 percent of those in the foreclosure
process were able to sell their property before the
foreclosure sale. This dropped to 18 percent in 2005,
and while the 2006 numbers are still inconclusive, 
it appears to have declined still further (to 11.5
percent). 
■ About one-third of the 2006 foreclosure sales 
involved owner occupants and two-thirds investor,
or absentee, owners. 
■ Although the racial and income characteristics of
the borrowers are not known, the foreclosure peti-
tions are clustered in low and moderate income
census tracts with high minority populations. 
■ All five of the top lenders responsible for 
originating mortgages that were foreclosed 
in 2006 specialize in subprime lending. 
Even if the current foreclosure activity does not end 
up having the same negative impact on the market that
the early 1990’s wave of foreclosures had, each individ-
ual foreclosure represents a substantial loss for the
homeowner involved. Moreover, it can be destabilizing
to a street or neighborhood, and if the property was a
two- or three-family home—and many of these are—
the tenants may also lose their home. 
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This section looks at how affordable housing in 
the region fared in 2006, given that overall housing
production was down by more than 11 percent
compared to 2005. It examines what was produced,
for whose benefit, where, and with what tools. In
evaluating the region’s progress, the Report Card
defines as affordable any housing that is eligible for
inclusion on the State’s Subsidized Housing Inven-
tory (SHI) and restricted to occupancy by households
earning 80 percent or less of the median family
income as defined by the federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). The
current HUD income limits for most of the cities 
and towns included in the Housing Report Card 
are $46,300 for a single person household; $52,950 
for a 2-person household; $59,550 for a 3-person
household; and $66,150 for a 4-person household.
The Report Card also looks at the region’s existing
supply of affordable housing and the challenges 
facing that inventory and the population it serves. 
The Municipal Scorecard (Appendix B) details the
progress each community made, if any, to expand
affordable housing opportunity in 2006 and what 
tools they used. For example, by looking up Acton, 
the reader would see that the town has a DHCD-
approved planned production plan and has received
certification of satisfactory progress under that plan,
that it produced new affordable housing units in 2006,
and has appropriated Community Preservation Act
funds to support its affordable housing efforts.
Counting Affordable Housing
The reader should note that the Report Card definition
of affordable housing is narrower than the one used by
the Department of Housing and Community Develop-
ment (DHCD) in its effort to determine whether a
municipality has met the goal of having 10 percent of
its year round housing qualify as subsidized. For that
purpose, DHCD counts market rate units in mixed
income rental properties28 in the “affordable” count. 
It also includes group homes for populations with
special needs, and existing homes that are repaired or
upgraded using state or federal resources, as long as
the occupant is income eligible. 
Currently the subsidized housing inventory credits 31
Greater Boston municipalities with being at 10 percent
affordable, or better, with 6 having achieved that mile-
stone since last year’s Report Card. Over a period of
fifteen months, between March 2006 and July 2007,
Amesbury, Bellingham, Danvers, Mansfield, Quincy,
and Stoughton went over the 10 percent threshold.
Two former 10 percent communities—Andover and
Braintree—dropped below that threshold during the
past year after previously qualified low income units
were converted to market rate when their owners
opted out of the programs that required them to rent 
to low-income households.
During that 15 month period, the Subsidized Housing
Inventory reported a net increase of 3,485 units of
housing that qualified toward their host communities
10 percent requirement in the 161 municipalities
covered by the Report Card. In 65 of these (40 percent
of all Greater Boston cities and towns) the gain was 
the result of new production. 
Of those municipalities that went over 10 percent in
the past year, Bellingham, Danvers, Mansfield, and
Stoughton qualified as the result of having permitted,
under Chapter 40B, large mixed income rental devel-
opments with 20-25 percent of the units reserved for
low-income households. Quincy qualified as the result
of adding a new 233 unit affordable housing develop-
ment for low income seniors on the site of a former
naval base, and Amesbury by approving a 240 unit 40B
rental development that will be 20 percent affordable
within a larger 40R district. 
A number of Greater Boston communities have made
headway in increasing the supply, or improving the
quality, of housing for low income people in recent
years. Twelve municipalities received DHCD approval
of their Planned Production Plans in 2006-2007, bring-
ing to 53 the number approved through June 2007. Just
7 of the communities with approved plans, however,
5.
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are currently certified as having made adequate
progress under those plans. A municipality that has 
a DHCD-approved affordable housing plan and certifi-
cation from the agency that it has complied with that
plan by having produced qualified units equal to at
least three-quarters of 1 percent of its year round hous-
ing stock in a calendar year can get a one year reprieve
from comprehensive permit petitions that are inconsis-
tent with their plan. The 7 communities that were so
certified in Greater Boston are Acton, Berlin, Bolton,
Lakeville, Natick, Sharon, and Stoughton.
2006 Performance Overview
The number of new affordable housing units produced
in 2006 was down by 3.4 percent compared to 2005, 
the first year-over-year drop since the Housing Report
Card began tracking in 1999. While slightly below 
its 2005 high, the 2006 affordable production was the
second highest in at least a decade. It represents an
increase of 70 percent over the 1,427 units created in
2002 and a more than tripling of the production levels
achieved in 1999 and 2000. More than 40 percent of the
region’s communities permitted at least some afford-
able housing in 2006, the same as in 2005, and double
the number that did so in 2000. The comprehensive
permit (Chapter 40B) was used by nearly three-quar-
ters (72%) of the communities adding affordable units. 
Creating Affordable Housing in a Declining Market
While the number of new affordable units in 2006
dropped only slightly from 2005, there were important
shifts in how these projects were being undertaken,
associated with the overall softening of the real estate
market. Massachusetts had become increasingly
dependent on market interventions such as 40B and, 
to a lesser degree, inclusionary mandates to sustain its
affordable housing production in recent years. This
shift reflects both the scarcity of public subsidies to
support the development of low-income housing and
increasing local barriers to the production of new
housing in general. Between 1972, when the state’s 
first Subsidized Housing Inventory was published,
and 1990, the Greater Boston region created more than
3,000 units of low-income housing per year. Nearly
two-thirds of this housing was located in Boston and
the region’s other cities, and virtually all of it was
funded, or deeply subsidized, by the federal or state
government.29 While 40B was an important tool for
siting the new housing, especially in suburban loca-
tions, the production and operating subsidies that
made it financially viable and enabled it to serve very
low-income households came from the government. 
By the beginning of this decade, however, deep subsi-
dies for low-income housing production were a distant
memory, and 40B had become the key to entry for new
development of any type in many Boston area commu-
nities. Between 2002 and 2005, 40Bs accounted for 52
percent of all new affordable production in the Greater
Boston region and 73 percent of the new affordable
units built outside the City of Boston. In the region’s
towns, it represented more than 30 percent of all new
housing produced and 80 percent of the new rental
housing. 
But 40B and inclusionary mandates are techniques that
depend on a strong housing market for success unless
they are accompanied by additional subsidies. Without
such subsidies, the development’s market rate units,
combined with any density bonus, must carry the
affordable units. And because the permitting process is
so protracted in Massachusetts, even under the “expe-
dited” approach provided by 40B, they require a rising
market. In a softening market, these tools are less effec-
tive. Now fewer 40B developments are being
proposed, and a growing number of approved projects
have stalled. Requests for site approval letters from
state agencies—the first step in the 40B process—have
fallen every year since 2004. Through July 2007, just 13
such requests have been processed by DHCD, a 78
percent drop from the same period in 2004. The overall
decline in new affordable production is attributable to
the slowdown in 40B activity.30
Beyond concerns about the soft and uncertain real
estate market, other factors are delaying construction
starts on approved 40B projects. These include: delays
in obtaining the “final approvals” necessary to proceed
from the state project administrators due to policy
differences between the state agencies and municipali-
ties; increased litigation from abutters, which puts
developments on hold; and extensive and time
consuming approval and permitting processes at 
the local level, even with a comprehensive permit.31
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Affordable Housing Leaders in 2006
Boston, the Commonwealth’s perennial leader in
affordable housing production, added 630 new units 
in 2006, an increase of more than 33 percent over 2005.
This represented 26 percent of the region’s affordable
housing production and nearly one-third of its afford-
able rental housing. On average, Boston adds more
than 500 new affordable units each year and maintains
an aggressive preservation program. It does an espe-
cially good job of serving families and individuals at
the lowest income levels. Nineteen percent of the city’s
new affordable housing will serve households earning
below 30 percent of the area median income, 14
percent will serve households earning between 30 
and 50 percent, 34 percent will serve those with
incomes between 50 and 60 percent, and 32 percent
will serve those earning between 60 and 80 percent of
the area median income. In addition to creating these
630 affordable units, Boston gained another 159 units
for middle income families—those earning between 80
and 120 percent of the area median income—through
its inclusionary zoning program. 
Boston, Cities Increase Market Share
Even though Boston maintains a constant and steady
pipeline of affordable development, much of it serving
the region’s neediest residents, the city’s share of the
affordable production had been shrinking over the past
several years as suburban communities gained units in
mixed income developments approved under Chapter
40B. In 2002, Boston production represented 39 percent
of the region’s new affordable housing; by 2005, the
city accounted for only 19 percent. Now, with a slug-
gish market, and continued hostility to 40Bs in many
communities, new starts under what had been the
Commonwealth’s primary production tool (40B) have
slowed. As a result, Boston’s share of the pie is again
increasing. In 2006, Boston was back to supplying 
over one-fourth (26%) of the affordable housing in 
the region. Table 5.1 illustrates this trend. 
At least some of Boston’s success can be traced to its
disciplined goal setting and transparent tracking and
reporting of performance against goal. As the 2006-
2007 Housing Report Card was going to press, the City
was preparing to announce its third multi-year hous-
ing strategy. Under the recently completed Leading 
the Way II, Mayor Menino had established a goal of
permitting 10,000 new units of housing (2,100 afford-
able), and preserving 3,000 units of at-risk rental hous-
ing between 2003 and 2007. A central goal of this initia-
tive was the creation of new affordable housing that
would address a broad range of needs, from the home-
less to the priced-out middle class. The City appears to
have met or exceeded its production and preservation
goals.32
The City of Cambridge, another leader in affordable
housing production, added 128 affordable units in
2006, all as the result of its inclusionary zoning ordi-
nance. Cambridge targets all its inclusionary units to
households earning less than 60 percent of area median
income. Other 2006 affordable housing leaders include
Quincy, Lexington, Dedham, Peabody, Haverhill, and
Chelsea. (The full municipality-by-municipality
accounting is included in Appendix B.)
Affordable Housing Production Tools
The mechanisms used to generate new affordable
housing in 2006 include traditional publicly subsidized
production carried out by a network of for-profit and
nonprofit developers who specialize in affordable
housing development; Chapter 40B production;
privately produced affordable housing undertaken 
by nonprofit organizations like Habitat for Humanity
that are able to raise the resources they need from non-
government sources; and inclusionary mandates under
which a set aside of affordable units, or a payment in
lieu of such units, is required of developers of market
rate housing. This latter category includes units
required by formal inclusionary zoning bylaws or 
ordinances, as well as units created under incentive
zoning, and those resulting from informal negotiation.
The first new affordable units resulting from 40R Smart
Growth development districts were permitted in 2006
in Chelsea, Haverhill, and Norwood; in 2007, building
permits were issued for the largest 40R to date, in
North Reading. 
40B Continues to Play a Dominant Role
Fifty of the communities that permitted new affordable
housing in 2006 did so under the comprehensive
permit, 13 gained units through inclusionary or 
incentive zoning (or negotiation), and 9 employed
traditional subsidies. As illustrated in Table 5.1, the
comprehensive permit was utilized in the production
of 36 percent of all new affordable units and 48 percent
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TABLE 5.1 
New Affordable Housing Production, 2003-2006 
Total Affordable Affordable
Affordable Homeownership Rental
Year Units Units Units
2006
City of Boston 630 117 513
Elsewhere in Greater Boston Region 1,792 658 1,134
Elsewhere - 40B Comp Permit 894 466 428
Elsewhere - All Others 898 192 706
Total New Affordable Production 2,422 775 1,647
Boston share of total 26% 15% 31%
% of total using 40B Comprehensive Permit 37% 60% 26%
% using 40B Comp Permit excluding Boston 50% 71% 38%
All new units other than those using 40B 1,528 309 1,219
2005
City of Boston 472 232 240
Elsewhere in Greater Boston Region 2,036 973 1,063
Elsewhere - 40B Comp Permit 1,449 757 692
Elsewhere - All Others 587 216 371
Total New Affordable Production 2,508 1,205 1,303
Boston share of total 19% 19% 18%
% of total using 40B Comprehensive Permit 58% 63% 53%
% using 40B Comp Permit excluding Boston 71% 78% 65%
2004
City of Boston 511 58 453
Elsewhere in Greater Boston Region 1,486 580 906
Elsewhere - 40B Comp Permit 1,185 475 710
Elsewhere - All Others 301 105 196
Total New Affordable Production 1,997 638 1,359
Boston share of total 26% 9% 33%
% of total using 40B Comprehensive Permit 59% 74% 52%
% using 40B Comp Permit excluding Boston 80% 82% 78%
All new units other than those using 40B 812 163 649
2003
City of Boston 703 153 550
Elsewhere in Greater Boston Region 1,186 357 829
Elsewhere - 40B Comp Permit 989 343 646
Elsewhere - All Others 197 14 183
Total New Affordable Production 1,889 510 1,379
Boston share of total 37% 30% 40%
% of total using 40B Comprehensive Permit 52% 67% 47%
% using 40B Comp Permit excluding Boston 83% 96% 78%
All new units other than those using 40B 900 167 733
Source: CURP analysis of SHI, 40B tracking reports, and production reported by municipalities
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of those created outside the City of Boston, down 
from 58 and 71 percent, respectively, in 2005. The 
2006 growth in the number of affordable units gained
through inclusionary zoning is largely attributable to
Boston, Cambridge, and a single project in Lexington
(the redevelopment of a former state hospital). The
Boston and Cambridge inclusionary policies have 
been in effect for many years.
For most municipalities, 40B is not the preferred mecha-
nism for developing their affordable housing, and more
than a few have advocated for greater local control;
without it, though, their progress has been limited. 
The zoning in many of the region’s 161 municipalities
simply does not provide for compact, higher density, or
multifamily development anywhere in the community,
even where their historical settlement patterns allowed
it. To accommodate alternative types of development
that are not permitted under current zoning or via
special permit, a town must either use 40B, or garner 
the two-thirds vote of Town Meeting required to rezone.
The seven municipalities that are currently certified as
having made adequate progress under their planned
production plans all achieved that status as the result 
of 40B development, as did most of those that attained
the 10 percent threshold in recent years.
While 40B remains the key creating affordable housing
in many communities, its very existence has prompted
others to seek alternative strategies to achieve the same
goal. An increasing number have adopted inclusionary
or incentive zoning, negotiated some level of afford-
ability as part of their special permit process, or initi-
ated affordable housing development on town-owned
parcels. Many of the communities taking such steps, 
as well as those that have created—or are considering
creating—“Smart Growth Zoning” districts under the
Chapter 40R have been motivated to do so because of
the existence of 40B. 
But More Communities Are Exploring Other
Mechanisms
Inclusionary zoning has begun to put up some impres-
sive numbers, but the production is overwhelmingly in
the cities, Boston and Cambridge, in particular. Among
the suburban communities that have generated the
most new units through inclusionary mechanisms 
are those like Lexington and Danvers that established
affordability as a goal for the redevelopment of surplus
state hospital properties. The pace and scale of devel-
opment in most of the region’s smaller communities 
is so limited that inclusionary incentives or mandates
would seldom be triggered. 
The Community Preservation Act (CPA), a local
option tax, has been adopted by 66 Greater Boston
municipalities, and 38 of these have allocated some
funds for housing. But as with the inclusionary
zoning, only a handful are aggressively using it for
housing. Cambridge is the big exception here as well.
The City commits most of its community preservation
funds to its housing trust fund to support affordable
housing development, preservation, and/or acquisi-
tion. Cambridge has committed nearly $38 million to
date, or 63 percent of all the CPA funds that have been
allocated to housing in Greater Boston since the law’s
enactment in 2000.33
TABLE 5.2
Affordable Housing Production by 
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Source: CURP analysis of DHCD, MassHousing, MHP, and 
MassDevelopment production lists and data provided by municipalities
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We noted last year that the share of new affordable
housing produced by the state’s traditional subsidized
housing developers was shrinking, as new units
increasingly were created as a by-product of market
rate production carried out by a diverse group that
included small local homebuilders and large national
real estate investment trusts. That changed in 2006. 
The traditional low-income housing developers, using
the traditional subsidy programs, once again repre-
sented the largest share of the region’s affordable 
housing production. The number of units created 
using these programs rose from 699 in 2005 to 988 in
2006, an increase of more than 41 percent. Table 5.2
and Figure 5.1 document these shifts. 
tion v. preservation) but the total dollars allocated to
the major programs has not changed much in recent
years. That Greater Boston fared so much better in 2006
than it had in the three previous years simply indicates
that area projects, which had been in the planning
stages for several years, finally secured the necessary
resources and approvals to commence construction.
Despite the challenges of creating and managing
housing for low-income families and individuals in 
an era of inadequate public resources and rising costs,
competition for the subsidy programs that do exist is
intense. DHCD, the agency responsible for allocating
most of the public resources, attempts to strike a
balance among competing demands in selecting which
projects it funds. The agency tries to accommodate a
range of household types and needs, achieve an equi-
table geographic distribution, and provide funds to
preserve the existing affordable inventory as well as 
to expand it. As a result, worthy projects sometimes
are not funded on their first application, and they
must be reworked or resubmitted at a later date. 
Most of the subsidized projects that moved into
construction in 2006 had been awarded grants, 
tax credits, or both, a year or two earlier.
Multiple Funding Sources Required
On average, about 30 Greater Boston projects a year
receive funding from one or more of the following
programs: 
■ The federal and state Low Income Housing Tax
Credit programs and the state historic tax credit
program; 
■ The federal 202 and 811 Programs and HOME 
Partnerships Program; 
■ The state Housing Innovations Fund, Housing
Stabilization Fund, Facilities Consolidation Fund,
Housing Development Support Program, Capital
Improvement and Preservation Fund, Community
Based Housing Fund, and the Affordable Housing
Trust Fund. 
Projects that receive funding awards under many of
these programs may also receive financing from one of
the state quasi-public agencies, such as MassHousing,
MassDevelopment, the Massachusetts Housing Part-
nership, and the Community Economic Development
Assistance Corporation, or the private Massachusetts
Housing Investment Corporation. 
Traditional Subsidies are the Mainstay for 
Assisting the Very Low Income
Unlike production under 40B and inclusionary zoning,
which can fluctuate widely from year to year depend-
ing on market conditions, the funding for subsidized
development is fairly predictable. The number of units
may rise or fall depending on the location and mix of
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Affordable Housing Production by 
Type of Public Support, 2003-2006
Source: CURP analysis of DHCD, MassHousing, MHP, and 
MassDevelopment production lists and data provided by municipalities
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In the past few years, the State Legislature and various
agencies have established additional funding pools,
most to support development in “smart growth” loca-
tions. These include the Priority Development Fund, the
Transit Oriented Development Fund and the Commer-
cial Area Transit Neighborhood Housing Program.34
Twenty-nine developments in 17 Greater Boston
communities received funding commitments totaling
$40.5 million from these traditional sources in 2006 to
create affordable housing. Once constructed, these
developments will provide 1,032 new units, 942 (91
percent) of which will be affordable. Most will be
restricted to households earning below 60 percent of the
area median income. Three other Boston area projects
will receive more than $4.1 million to preserve existing
affordable housing and replace a distressed public hous-
ing development totaling another 422 units (417 afford-
able). Also in 2006, funding awards of $27.8 million
were made to 21 properties in other parts of the state 
to build or preserve another 913 units (816 affordable).
As is often the case, two-thirds of the Greater Boston
developments received awards from more than one
subsidy source: 10 received funds from two sources;
five from three or four sources; and four from five or
six sources. Twenty-one of the project sponsors were
nonprofit developers, five were for-profit, and two
were joint ventures between the two. The average
subsidy awarded per unit was just over $39,000.
Approximately $7 million of the funds awarded in
2006 will come from equity generated through the 
sale of federal and state low-income housing tax 
credits to individual and corporate investors.35
Threats to the Existing Affordable 
Housing Inventory 
With the supply/demand equation so out of balance 
at the time the Housing Report Card was initiated, its
focus has been on production. While that remains a
priority, preservation has become an increasingly criti-
cal concern. The region’s existing subsidized housing
stock is threatened on several fronts. Rental develop-
ments built during the 1960s to the 1980s with federal
or state subsidized mortgages and/or project-based
rental assistance may be converted from low income to
market rate housing once the restrictions that limited
their occupancy to low-income residents expire. Some
more recent projects are, or will be, affected as well.
These units are often called “EURs,” or properties with
“expiring use restrictions.”36 Low-income units are also
lost when older public housing developments are
allowed to deteriorate, or become functionally obsolete.
Some units are sacrificed when a property is rehabili-
tated to meet current needs, or is demolished, without 
a one-for-one unit replacement. Greater Boston’s record
on preservation was mixed in 2006-2007. 
The Expiring Use/Expiring Subsidy Risk
Statewide, more than 10,500 subsidized units have 
had their mortgages prepaid and/or their subsidy
contracts expire. This represents nearly 13 percent of
the 85,000 low-income units built or substantially reha-
bilitated under federal or state subsidy programs in
Massachusetts from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s.
The majority of these units have retained some degree
of affordability because the projects were sold or refi-
nanced under programs that required renewed afford-
ability commitments, but according to CEDAC, the
quasi-public agency that maintains a comprehensive
data base of at-risk properties, more than 5,400 units
have been permanently lost as affordable housing. 
Most of these losses occurred 10-15 years ago but now
there are some 27,000 units statewide that are at risk
over the next three years, two-thirds of them in Greater
Boston. The affordability restrictions on some 5,000
units created under more recent housing programs
dating from the mid-1980s to 1990 are also beginning
to expire. While industry analysts and housing advo-
cates differ on how many units are truly at risk, the
most common estimate is about 25 percent, or nearly
7,000 units.37 Because of their scale and location, many
of these developments could not be replicated today
even if funds were available. Even those that are
unlikely candidates for conversion to condominiums
or higher income occupancy require substantial invest-
ment and upgrading after 30-40 years.
DHCD, MassHousing, and the state’s other quasi-
public agencies have programs to preserve expiring
use properties. Between 2001 and 2005 they preserved
more than 9,100 units including 7,600 affordable units
in the 161 communities covered by the Report Card.38
In 2006, another 300 affordable units were preserved,
but Boston, Brookline, Somerville, Braintree, Lawrence,
Cambridge, and Andover all lost units as developments
were removed from the subsidized inventory when
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owners opted out of the programs that had restricted
occupancy to low-income tenants. Additional develop-
ments are at risk this year. The low-income tenants are
rarely evicted when properties convert to market rate
development. Typically, qualified residents are
provided market rate rent subsidies called “enhanced
vouchers” that enable them to remain in their homes,
while providing the owner the full market rent for
their unit. These vouchers, which are provided by
HUD, protect the existing tenants as long as they
remain in their units. Once they leave, those units are
no longer protected. Over time, the development is
likely to become more market rate as the subsidized
tenants moved out. 
Funding for one of the most frequently used 
preservation programs, the Capital Improvement 
and Preservation Fund, was eliminated in 2005 
and the use of the Housing Stabilization Fund for
preservation projects was also curtailed. As a result,
“preservation owners”—those nonprofit or for profit
developers who seek to restructure and preserve
properties as subsidized housing—were thwarted in
their efforts to move projects forward in 2006. By year
end, however, the new administration had re-funded
the Capital Improvement and Preservation Fund and
revoked changes to the Housing Stabilization Fund
and the tax credit program to ensure that these
resources would be available in 2007 and beyond. 
The State’s Public Housing Authorities 
Challenge DHCD
State funded public housing represents 23 percent of
the region’s subsidized inventory, and it serves many
of the region’s lowest income families and seniors,
including those with special needs. Such housing is
found in 140 Greater Boston municipalities. Housing
professionals have long contended that this stock has
been inadequately funded, and that it is in need of
substantial investment to preserve its functionality and
extend its life. In 2006, three of the state’s largest hous-
ing public housing authorities filed suit in Suffolk
Superior Court to compel the Commonwealth to meet
its contractual and statutory obligations to support the
operation and maintenance of its public housing units.
The plaintiffs in the case—the Boston, Brookline, and
Cambridge Housing Authorities—testified that they
were forced to take units offline because they had
insufficient resources to make them safe and habitable. 
State law requires the Commonwealth to fund the
difference between the actual costs of maintaining
public housing units and the rent tenants pay, but the
suit alleged that the state, through its Department of
Housing and Community Development and Executive
Office of Administration and Finance, had neglected 
to do so and instead arbitrarily capped the housing
authorities' budgets far below the required amounts.
Others had made the same argument, including the
State Auditor (in an October 2006 report) and Massa-
chusetts Association of Housing and Redevelopment
Officials (Mass NAHRO). A 2005 study conducted by
Abt Associates and the Harvard Graduate School of
Design39 recommended that the annual appropriation
for operating support for state-funded public housing
be increased by approximately $80 million to an annual
level of about $115 million to enable local housing
authorities to continue to do their work. The report
noted that if this could not be accomplished in a single
year, the increases should be phased in over a three-to-
five-year period. 
The plaintiff housing authorities sought to obtain
funds that had been authorized but not paid, and 
also to secure sufficient and predictable funding in 
the future. Just four months after the lawsuit was filed,
with a new Governor and new leadership team in
place, millions of dollars owed to these three housing
authorities and others, were paid, and the suit was
dropped. The housing authorities and other stake-
holders have begun meeting with the new administra-
tion to address these issues, and the fiscal year 2008
includes an increase of $15 million of operating funds
to begin to make up for years of inadequate operating
subsidy.
Together the state public housing and the “at risk”
expiring use inventory represent more than 36 percent
the affordable housing in the region. Preserving exist-
ing affordable stock is usually more cost effective 
than replacing it with new construction and it often
provides spin-off benefits to the surrounding neighbor-
hood. Furthermore, it avoids the challenge of locating
new sites for affordable housing. Section 6, which
describes recent trends in public spending and support
for affordable housing, suggests the outlook is indeed
improving for the state’s older public and assisted
inventory.
6.
Public Spending and Support for Housing
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The Commonwealth is justifiably proud of its leader-
ship in the subsidized housing arena. For more than 25
years, the state’s Department of Housing and Commu-
nity Development (DHCD), its quasi-public develop-
ment agencies, local and regional housing authorities,
and an array of private for profit and nonprofit housing
developers and owners have continued to cobble
together resources to preserve and expand the supply of
affordable housing in one of the most challenging hous-
ing markets in the country. The federal Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) spends some
$2 billion annually in Massachusetts, but only a small
portion of this is funding that flows through DHCD.40
In FY2007, the total spending over which DHCD had
oversight included $391 million from federal sources
and $258 million directly from the state. In addition, the
state’s quasi-public agencies—MassDevelopment, the
Massachusetts Housing Partnership and MassHous-
ing—provided more than $400 million in financing to
support low and moderate income housing develop-
ment and preservation in Massachusetts.41
This section examines the progress made over the 
past year and a half to preserve and expand the supply 
of housing for low-income households; foster strong,
sustainable neighborhoods; and reduce local barriers to
new market rate housing in Greater Boston and across
the state. It also includes updates on two important
new initiatives: Chapter 40R, the state’s smart growth
zoning law; and Metro Futures, the Metropolitan Area
Planning Council’s blue print for growth in the region
between now and 2030.
Public Spending
Federal Funding
For the past five years, approximately $400 million
annually has flowed through DHCD from the federal
Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD). While the federal contribution has increased
from $212 million in FY (fiscal year) 1994 to $391 million
in FY2007, very little of this increase is available for
new production, or even preservation. Most of the
federal funding that DHCD receives takes the form of
rent subsidies for low-income tenants in existing hous-
ing, and home heating assistance and weatherization
programs for low-income homeowners. The dollars
committed may increase one year and drop the next as
the cost of honoring existing commitments rises or falls.
For example, Massachusetts received $13 million more
for low-income home energy assistance and weather-
ization assistance for low-income households in FY2006
than in FY2007.
Final federal fiscal year 2008 figures are not yet avail-
able, but 2007 federal funding was down by 7 percent
from 2006, a drop of nearly $29 million. In addition to
the decline in funding for home heating and weather-
ization, funding for the HOME Program and the
Community Development Block Grant Small Cities
Program dropped by $5 million and $13.6 million
respectively. Funding for the federal Housing Choice
Voucher Program (Section 8) administered by DHCD
and 8 regional nonprofit organizations was increased
by $3.7 million. Figure 6.1 tracks total DHCD spending
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State Funding
The news is more positive on the state front. After
having fallen to a nine-year low of $187 million in
2004, total state spending for all DHCD programs has
risen in each succeeding year bringing the 2008 total to
$299 million. This represents the highest level of
support from the state since 1991. In inflation adjusted
dollars, however, the current spending level is 23
percent less than it was in 1991, and only half the $410
million committed in 1989. 
The Commonwealth’s housing resources come from its
operating and capital budgets and, as Figure 6.2 illus-
trates, both have increased since 2005. After increasing
$10 million in FY2007 over FY2006, funding from the
state’s operating budget rose another $17 million in
FY2008.42 On the capital side, the FY2008 increase of
$23.5 million represents a 19 percent increase over
2007. This is significant because it is the state’s bond-
funded programs that support the production of new
housing, the creation of housing for those with special
needs, and the preservation of existing subsidized and
public housing. Public housing was the big winner in
FY2008, receiving a substantial boost of $15 million;
most other bond programs were level funded.
Other State Support for Housing
In its first six months in office, the Patrick administra-
tion achieved some important milestones on the hous-
ing front. These include reorganization of the state’s
housing related functions and, in partnership with the
legislature, securing commitments of additional funds
for housing programs. Significant accomplishments
include:
Organization and management of the state’s housing-
related functions
■ The Department of Housing and Community Devel-
opment was elevated to cabinet status within a new
Executive Office of Housing and Economic Develop-
ment, and an Undersecretary for Housing was
appointed to oversee the traditional DHCD functions.
■ A Development Cabinet was created in the Gover-
nor's office. Chaired by the Governor, the Cabinet
includes all of the major secretariats with responsi-
bilities for housing, economic development, and
labor, education, and transportation. The Cabinet is
responsible for coordinating the economic develop-
ment policy-making process; ensuring coordination
between and among state agencies on priority
economic development projects; providing advice
on economic development policy to the Governor;
ensuring that economic development policy deci-
sions, projects, and programs are consistent with the
stated goals of the Administration; and monitoring
implementation of the Governor's economic devel-
opment agenda. 
■ An ombudsman has been appointed to help spur
economic growth by speeding permitting approval
time from two to three years to just six months on
development projects.
■ Decision making over bond-funded programs was
streamlined in DHCD, and discussions are under-
way to identify additional ways to streamline appli-
cation, project review, and closing processes. 
■ DHCD has implemented a reorganization intended
to provide better coordination and centralized tech-
nical assistance and training to municipalities across
various program areas.
Capital planning and budgeting
■ The administration developed a five-year capital
investment plan that would raise the State’s bond
cap from $1.5 billion in 2008 to $2.0 billion in 2012.
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The plan includes more than $170 million in funding
for public housing and private affordable housing
development in FY08, a 33 percent increase over the
prior year. Public housing is scheduled to receive $90
million in FY08, including $5 million through the
Affordable Housing Trust Fund, representing a $30
million increase over the amount budgeted in FY07.
The bill also provides $80.5 million for private
affordable housing development programs in FY08,
including $20 million for the Housing Stabilization
Fund and $25 million for the Affordable Housing
Trust Fund (in addition to the $5 million dedicated to
public housing). This represents an 18 percent
increase over FY07 spending. And to support the
Administration’s Sustainable Development Princi-
ples, the FY08 plan includes $7.5 million for housing
near public transit—$5 million for the “Housing at
Transit Nodes” program, and at least $2.5 million for
housing projects from the $4.5 million total allocation
for the Transit-Oriented Development program.
■ Under the Executive Office for Administration and
Finance’s 2007 federal tax exempt bond volume cap
plan MassDevelopment received $200 million,
equally divided between economic development
projects and multifamily affordable housing proj-
ects; MassHousing received $175 million ($50
million for below market-rate mortgages to home-
buyers and $125 million for multifamily affordable
housing projects); and $22 million will be reserved
for capital improvements to public housing. In addi-
tion to the funding levels, two important policy
changes were implemented. The first lifted restric-
tions imposed by the prior Administration regard-
ing the use of the volume cap for preservation
projects, and the second requires that before
MassHousing or MassDevelopment may allocate
the volume cap to finance multifamily affordable
housing projects, the borrower must receive an
award of federal tax credits from the Department of
Housing and Community Development. 
■ The Capital Improvement and Preservation Fund,
an important tool for preserving existing affordable
housing was reactivated, effective July 1, 2007.
Funding for the program is included under the
FY08 DHCD bond cap.
Combating Homelessness
■ In July 2007, the Governor and the legislature
created a new Commission to End Homelessness,
co-chaired by Undersecretary for Housing and
Community Development Tina Brooks and State
Representative Byron Rushing. The commission
represents a joint effort by the administration and
the legislature to develop new strategies for assist-
ing households earning below 30 percent of the area
median income. The 30-member panel of state and
local officials, private sector advocates, and service
providers has been charged with formulating a
comprehensive action plan to end homelessness in
Massachusetts. The commission is to deliver recom-
mendations to the Governor by December 2007,
which are expected to include a blueprint for a
broad based housing plan that recognizes service
needs to end homelessness, and a five-year budget
proposal to guide the executive and legislative
branches of state government in implementing
housing and support service strategies. 
Other
■ The lawsuit that had been brought by the Boston,
Cambridge, and Brookline Housing Authorities
against DHCD (discussed in Section 5) was settled
out of court. As part of the settlement, DHCD will
develop an action plan for state public housing 
revitalization. The administration has set aside $22
million in private activity bonds for public housing
revitalization. Several important steps have already
been implemented to streamline budget and capital
improvement approvals, and funding for public
housing operating subsidies was increased by 
$15 million (33 percent) 
■ In July 2007, the Governor and MassHousing
announced a new $250 million mortgage loan
program offering foreclosure prevention counseling
and fixed-interest rate refinancing loans to help 
Massachusetts homeowners get out from under-
neath increasingly unaffordable subprime loans. 
The program is targeted to homeowners with
modest incomes who were put into loans that were
unaffordable and unsustainable, and where abusive
practices may have been used by the lender. House-
hold incomes may not exceed 135 percent of the area
median in the Boston area and 125 percent of the 
area median income for the rest of the state. Quali-
fied borrowers may be able to obtain up to a 40-year,
fixed-interest rate loan for up to 105 percent of the
value of the home, as determined by an appraisal.
Interest rates are expected to be approximately 
7-7/8 percent at the outset. 
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■ Foreclosure protections for homeowners adversely
affected by subprime lenders were announced by
the Governor in July. As the 2006-2007 Housing
Report Card was going to press, the state Senate had
approved legislation to address subprime lending
and foreclosures. The bill creates reporting require-
ments for mortgage lenders and requires the Divi-
sion of Banks to review and rate lenders on their
performance. It also establishes annual licensing
requirements for mortgage brokers, requires that
borrowers offered high cost loans receive in-person
counseling from a qualified nonprofit, and requires
fuller disclosure of terms in mortgage advertising.
Lenders must give most borrowers a 90-day period
in which they can pay the delinquency and reinstate
the loan before imposing attorney fees and borrow-
ers would have the right to cure a mortgage default
up to the foreclosure auction. 
Moving Toward Smart Growth
In recent years the Commonwealth has stepped up its
efforts to encourage “smart growth” development with
an array of financial and regulatory incentives, includ-
ing financial assistance to communities that are hosting
large scale new development in smart growth loca-
tions. Smart growth—the planning philosophy that
advocates higher-density mixed-use development,
emphasizing walkability and the use of mass transit
and existing infrastructure—is starting to take hold in
Massachusetts. The concept evolved as an antidote to
sprawl, which is often characterized by low-density,
single-use zoning districts dependent on automobiles,
but it has the potential to help mitigate the region’s
chronically high housing costs.
While much of what is currently under construction,
and even much of what is in the permitting stage, had
been proposed without the benefit of these new
programmatic initiatives, it was the passage of Chapter
40R, the state’s new Smart Growth Zoning statute and
its companion school funding insurance fund, Chapter
40S, that generated widespread interest in an alterna-
tive approach to encouraging local communities to
play a greater role in encouraging the production of
housing, including affordable units.
40R and 40S Become a Reality
Chapters 40R and 40S have established an impressive
track record in a very short period of time. Chapter
40R was signed into law in June 2004, but the critical
school funding legislation, 40S, was not enacted until
16 months later. Together, the two statutes are intended
to spur housing production and economic develop-
ment by providing four incentives to communities that
zone for higher density housing, with 40R offering: 
■ An incentive payment to the community when the
zoning is passed of approximately $1,000 per hous-
ing unit allowed (the amount varies according to a
sliding scale from $10,000 to $600,000, depending 
on the number of units);
■ A bonus payment equal to $3,000 per housing unit
when a building permit is issued; and
■ Increased priority for requests for state capital funds
for communities that have passed 40R districts.
Under Chapter 40S communities receive insurance so
that if the cost of educating children living in new
housing in a Smart Growth District exceeds approxi-
mately 50 percent of the new property taxes from that
District, the State will make annual payments to cover
the difference.
The incentives are targeted to locations already served
by infrastructure as one of the primary goals of the
program was to have a surplus of zoned land, avail-
able with as-of-right approval processes in place, to
meet the needs of the housing marketplace. This was
intended to allow builders to move quickly in response
to increased demand and to help bring real property
prices down by providing a surplus of suitably zoned
land. To create a smart growth zoning district, a city 
or town must vote to establish one or more overlay
zoning districts that allow as-of-right densities of at
least eight units per acre for single family homes, 12
units per acre for two and three family homes, and 20
units per acre for multifamily homes. A minimum of 
20 percent of the housing units in the smart growth
district must be affordable for, and restricted to occu-
pancy by, households earning no more than 80 percent
of the area median income. 
As of July 2007, just three years after 40R’s passage and
only 18 months after 40S became law, 15 municipalities
have approved 40R districts.43 The Greater Boston
communities are: Norwood, North Reading, Plymouth,
Kingston, Lakeville, Natick, Chelsea, Haverhill, Lynn-
field, North Andover, Brockton, and Amesbury. Else-
where in the state Lunenburg, Dartmouth, and Grafton
have adopted 40R districts. If completed as planned,
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these districts will result in the construction of nearly
5,700 new units of housing (4,800 in Greater Boston). 
In addition to the approved districts, more than 30
communities statewide (25 in Greater Boston) are
actively considering them and/or have identified
specific developments, with the potential of creating
7,000 housing units, an encouraging response to a new
initiative. Boston, Belmont, Gardner, Lawrence, and
Northampton have all requested 40R letters of eligibil-
ity—the first step toward designation—from DHCD.
Districts in these five municipalities represent the
potential for nearly 2,300 additional housing units. Five
other communities are seeking, or have received, grants
from the state’s Priority Development Fund to pursue
40R, with the potential to add another 1,000 units, and
discussions are underway in another 17 communities. 
The first generation of 40R districts obtained the neces-
sary zoning approvals in relatively short order, cutting
months off the time typically required for approval,
and to date no community has turned down a district
when it came to a town meeting (or city council) vote.
Some of the largest developments will require state
review under the Massachusetts Environmental Policy
Act prior to construction start, but development is
already underway in Chelsea, Haverhill, North Read-
ing, and Norwood.44 In April 2007 Chapter 40R’s prin-
cipal architect, the Commonwealth Housing Task
Force, reported to the legislature’s Joint Committee on
Housing that participation in the program was ahead
of initial projections, although it acknowledged that
very few 40R Districts or proposals had provided for
the intended small lot single family detached housing. 
The most important cautionary note sounded by the
Task Force, in an otherwise upbeat assessment of 40R’s
first full year of operation, was that many communities
were not pursuing 40R because of concerns about the
stability of state funding. This concern has also affected
decision-making in communities where 40R considera-
tion is currently underway. Certainly honoring the
state’s financial commitment to 40R and 40S will be
necessary to ensure the continued success of the
program. Cities and towns fear that given the annual
state budget process, commitments of funds today may
not be available in years to come. The interest by more
than 44 rural, suburban and urban communities across
the state bodes well for substantial new production if
the funding uncertainties can be resolved. 
MetroFutures
Smart growth planning received another public boost
in May 2007, when the Metropolitan Area Planning
Council (MAPC) issued Metro Futures, a blueprint to
guide land use in the region between now and 2030.
MAPC is the regional planning agency for 101 of the
161 communities covered by the Housing Report 
Card. Built on the principles of smart growth, the
Metro Futures plan is consistent with the Common-
wealth’s sustainable development principles and the
goals of 40R. New residential development would be
concentrated in areas with the infrastructure to sustain
it instead of being dispersed across the region. 
MAPC expects the region to grow in population by 8.4
percent between 2000 and 2030.45 This overall growth
assumes a 5 percent population increase between 2000-
2010, another 3.2 percent increase between 2010 and
2020, and a 2.2 percent increase between 2020 and
2030. The plan projects that 50 percent of the region’s
new residents will be accommodated in its cities, and it
envisions that 60,000 urban starter homes (lofts, condo-
miniums, duplexes) will help to attract and retain
young professionals and their families in the urban
inner core and in regional urban centers outside of
Route 128. Suburban communities will steer two-thirds
of their growth to town centers and villages so that
half of the new suburban housing will be created
through reuse of previously developed areas, allowing
towns to grow while also protecting open spaces. The
region’s rural areas would retain their traditional New
England character with farms, forests, and open spaces
as new housing would be clustered to protect open
space. 
Metro Futures calls for new construction of housing in
a variety of types and price range. Apartments, town-
houses, and condominiums in town centers would
create more choices for retiring baby boomers,
enabling more of them to stay in their community.
That, in turn would free up more existing single family
homes for larger families. More than 41 percent of the
region’s 950,000 homeowners are over the age of 55; 11
percent are aged 75 or over. Metro Futures predicts
some 27,000 single family homes on small (1/4 acre)
lots will be built region-wide, double what would be
expected under current trends. Since more than half of
the region’s new moderately priced housing would be
in suburban towns, lower income families will have
greater housing choice to live anywhere in the region.
7.
Conclusion
The past year has been one in which modestly declin-
ing home prices in Greater Boston have created anxiety
among current homeowners while providing only
minimal relief to those who would like to buy a home
here and no relief to low-income renters. Following the
160 percent increase in home prices between 1995 and
2005, the median house price in the region is now
$371,000, 6 percent below its 2005 peak. After a modest
decline between 2001 and 2004, area rents have stabi-
lized and, in many submarkets, have increased over
the past two years. 
Combined with stagnating household income, 
affordability continues to be a serious problem for
many homeowners and renters despite the softening 
in the housing market. As of 2005, nearly 40 percent of
homeowners with mortgages were paying more than
30 percent of their gross income for housing, up from
just 27 percent in 2000. Half of all renters in 2005 were
paying more than 30 percent of their income in rent, up
from 39 percent in 2000. Indeed, one-quarter of renters
and 14 percent of homeowners were paying 50 percent
or more of their income to cover their housing costs.
With the softening housing market, the number of 
new permits for single family and multifamily units
has plummeted in 2007 from the levels achieved in the
previous two years. The decline has been particularly
sharp in single family production where we estimate
only about 4,000 units will be permitted in all of 2007,
down from nearly 7,300 only two years ago. 
Not all the news is bad, however. The new administra-
tion of Governor Patrick has focused increased atten-
tion on meeting the Commonwealth’s housing needs,
the legislature has committed additional state funding
to this end, and the number of municipalities attempt-
ing to expand housing opportunities in a “smart” and
sustainable way—including taking advantage of the
Chapter 40R and 40S housing legislation—is growing.
While housing prices are likely to continue to weaken
over the next year, generating anxiety among home-
owners who need to sell their homes, the decline—in
most communities—will not be precipitous. There are
a couple of factors that could negatively influence this
outcome, however. One would be a deep national
recession. Another would be an acceleration in the
number of foreclosures associated with subprime 
lending, which are highly concentrated in the region’s
low-income communities of color, or the spread of
foreclosures to other areas, including developments
currently under construction.
Performance Against the New Paradigm
Production Targets
After achieving in 2005, 90 percent of the target estab-
lished five years earlier in the New Paradigm report,
performance against the goal fell in 2006 to just 81
percent. At current permitting levels in 2007, it is 
possible that only about 55 percent of the target 
will be reached by the end of 2007. 
The original target, it should be remembered, repre-
sented an estimate of how much housing was needed
in Greater Boston to bring supply and demand into
alignment given reasonable estimates of population
and job growth. With slower growth in both than 
originally projected, housing demand has been
weaker than expected so housing prices have not 
risen appreciably faster than general inflation and
have actually declined over the past two years. 
Added housing supply helped to keep housing 
price appreciation in check as 2005 production levels
represented the strongest performance-against-target
up until that point. In 2002, only 56 percent of the
target was achieved; in 2003, 70 percent; and in 2004,
77 percent (see Table 7.1) After posting year-over-year
gains of 26, 26, and 13 percent, market rate production
in 2006 retreated to below its 2004 level. New subsi-
dized housing, while still well above its 2002-2004
performance was down by 4 percent from 2005. Only
student housing, among the three tracked sectors,
gained ground in 2006. 
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The Challenge Moving Forward 
The housing shortage that prompted civic leaders 
to call for an ambitious social compact to increase
housing starts in the 2000 New Paradigm report was 
the legacy of lagging production from 1993-2000 when
housing construction did not keep pace with demand
and rents and house prices skyrocketed. Housing starts
continued to drop through 2002, even as home prices
continued to climb. Between 2002 and 2005, however,
they increased by 68 percent. And because the popula-
tion and number of households began to decline just 
as the inventory started to grow, vacancy rates
returned to normal levels by 2006 indicating that
supply and demand were more in balance. Now rents
are relatively stable and house prices are dropping. 
Even though home prices are likely to continue to
decline in the near term, it would be a mistake to
conclude that the region no longer faces an affordable
housing challenge. The current market weakness 
will do little to ease the burden for the lowest income
households, and the region remains one of the highest
cost housing markets in the nation. Recent production
levels—especially of single family homes, now at their
lowest level in nearly 30 years—are unlikely to be
adequate to meet demand if the economy is to thrive.
Little new detached single family housing, other than
that which is age restricted, is being built for sale at
prices below $400,000, without the benefit of Chapter
40B. There is somewhat more condominium develop-
ment, including suburban townhouses in a handful 
of communities and loft conversions in urban settings.
The pipeline remains impressive, but current market
and regulatory conditions are not favorable for getting
new units from the planning stage to actual production
in a timely manner.
Over the longer term, there is some relief coming from
the turnover of the existing housing stock. Much of 
the region’s housing is in the hands of an aging popu-
lation: 41 percent of homeowners are over the age of
55, including 22 percent over 65 and 11 percent over 
75. A generational turnover of tsunami proportions is
inevitable, even allowing for those who wish to age 
in place to do so. Much of the stock that may become
available is located in communities that boast the
strongest public school systems in the state. This
generational turnover is already becoming evident,
and explains why communities with stable or declin-
ing populations and little new housing production 
are experiencing significant increases in their school
enrollments. 
Still, complacency—especially regarding the prognosis
for lower income households –cannot be justified, even
if it turns out that the region is experiencing more of a
short term housing squeeze than a long term shortfall.
The rising foreclosure problem is devastating families
who bought their first home using subprime credit,
and the use restrictions and/or subsidy contracts on
nearly 15,000 units of privately-owned, subsidized
TABLE 7.1
Performance Against New Paradigm Targets
Target Change
Category Production 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2005-2006
Market Rate 14,000 8,093 10,232 11,559 13,053 11,337 -1,716
% of Need 57.8% 73.1% 82.6% 93.2% 81.0% -13.1%
Subsidized New 
Construction 3,000 1,427 1,889 1,997 2,523 2,422 -101
% of Need 47.6% 63.0% 66.6% 84.1% 80.7% -4.0%
Student Housing 1,000 429 516 357 581 880 299
% of Need 42.9% 51.6% 35.7% 58.1% 88.0% 51.5%
Total 3 Categories 18,000 9,949 12,637 13,913 16,157 14,639 -1,518
% of Need 55.3% 70.2% 77.3% 89.8% 81.3% -9.4%
Source: CURP update of earlier Report Cards and analysis of 2005 production
housing in the Greater Boston region are at-risk of
expiring by 2010. These trends threaten both afford-
ability and neighborhood stability and warrant close
monitoring.
How Much New Housing is Required?
To check whether 18,000 new units annually was still
an appropriate target, given that the region has made
up much of the production shortfall of the 1990s—
mostly as the result of population loss, coupled with
new multifamily production—the Housing Report
Card’s authors posed the following question: How
much new housing might be required if the New
England Economic Partnership estimates of job 
growth for the state are realized, and if the 
Greater Boston region mirrors those estimates:
■ 107,000 new jobs over 5 years = 20,400 new
jobs/year in an employment area that comprises
about 90 percent of the 5-county area. Assuming 
1.3 workers per household, all moving into the 5
Greater Boston counties, the 5-county area would
need to be producing 17,435 new units per year. 
While this new geography is somewhat smaller than
the original Greater Boston footprint, it is reasonable 
to suggest that 18,000 new units per year remains an
appropriate target, if the region is to adequately house
a growing workforce. Of course, if population and job
growth continue to be anemic, we may have seen the
end of rapid home price appreciation for some time to
come. But that would also mean the region will face an
even greater challenge: remaining competitive in the
global economy. The continued loss of young working
families would not bode well for the future prosperity
of the region. 
Despite the current weakness in the housing market, 
it is essential that state and local governments work
together to assure that new production—however
much is required—can be brought on line at more
reasonable prices, and in a timely, predictable, and
equitable manner. Without such a commitment, it is
likely that high housing prices and rents will continue
to discourage young workers and their families from
remaining in the region or moving here. 
68 U n d e r s t a n d i n g  B o s t o n
69T h e  G r e a t e r  B o s t o n  H o u s i n g  R e p o r t  C a r d  2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 7
Endnotes
1 MGL Chapter 40B (Sections 20-23), enacted in 1969, allows developers of subsidized housing where at least 20-25 percent of
the units are affordable to apply for all necessary local approvals in the form of a single “comprehensive permit” and to
request overrides of local zoning and other restrictions if necessary to make the housing economically feasible. In communi-
ties where less than 10 percent of the year-round housing is subsidized and little progress has been made in recent years,
developers can ask the State Housing Appeals Committee to overturn local denials of a comprehensive permit or the imposi-
tion of conditions they believe make a project infeasible absent a finding that the project presents serious health or safety
hazards.
2 Foreclosure data has been provided to the Housing Report Card by ForeclosuresMass Corp., copyright August 2007.
3 Robert Shiller and Karl Case have written extensively on this subject. Dr. Case recently addressed the factors that are 
influencing the nation’s housing markets in a December 2006 policy brief (#06-4) prepared for the New England Public 
Policy Center at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Policy entitled The Changing Housing Market: A Bang or a Whimper?
4 Employment statistics are reported for the Boston-Cambridge-Quincy Metropolitan New England City and Town Area
(NECTA), a designation that includes 155 of the 161 municipalities covered by the Housing Report Card. The only towns not
included are Lancaster, Wareham, Blackstone, Millville, Bellingham, and Plainville. See note to reader in the preface about
changes in data reporting geographies.
5 As prices spiraled up between 2003 and 2005, more buyers were priced out of the market. If traditional underwriting stan-
dards had remained in place during this period, demand would likely have dropped and prices might have moderated
sooner. Instead, lenders responded by introducing new “exotic” mortgage products that qualified more “high risk” borrowers
for a mortgage. The result has been the dramatic rise in delinquencies and foreclosures (discussed in Section 4). 
6 In 2005 the American Community Survey, and many other data reporters, began using the newly configured 2003 metropoli-
tan area definitions. The Boston-Quincy-Cambridge MA-NH metro area now includes these five counties in their entirety,
along with Rockingham and Strafford Counties in New Hampshire. In order to track demographic and economic changes
over time, the Report Card analyzed data for these five counties going back to 2000. The 155 Massachusetts municipalities
included in these five counties approximate the definition of Greater Boston that the Housing Report Card had been using.
The difference is that 11 Worcester County municipalities, and 7 in Bristol County, that have been included in the Housing
Report Card are not included in this table. Three Plymouth County towns, and one in Middlesex County, that have not been
covered by the Report Card are included here.
7 Since most homeowners without a mortgage are seniors, many with lower incomes, the incidence of cost burden among this
category of homeowner has increased at an even greater rate than their younger counterparts who have hefty mortgage
payments, but higher incomes.
8 Among its limitations, the survey does not distinguish between single family attached and single family detached struc-
tures, or between units constructed for homeownership and those built as rentals. It does not capture units that are newly
created as the result of adaptive reuse of non-residential properties. The survey covers most, but not all jurisdictions, and
participation is voluntary. Where data are missing or incomplete, the Census Bureau imputes activity from prior years. 
9 Often these involve “teardowns”—the replacement of older, smaller dwellings.
10 Examples cited in this report are illustrative of the types of housing being produced under the various types of zoning.
They do not represent an exhaustive list of new development.
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11 Systems over that size (generally serving more than 90 bedrooms) must obtain a groundwater discharge permit.
12 Title 5 regulations are found at 310 CMR 15.000.
13 Generally these I/A technologies are better than conventional septic systems at removing solids and other pollutants from
wastewater before it goes to the soil absorption system. They can also provide advanced treatment to reduce the wastewater's
nitrogen content.
14 The Pioneer Institute also surveyed a number of municipalitie within the MWRA service area as well as several cities that
are not part of the MWRA. Since most of these communities are fully, or substantially sewered, they are not included in Table
3.3.
15 The U.S. Census Bureau conducts the AHS for the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) to obtain a
wide range of housing statistics. National data are collected every other year, from a fixed sample of about 50,000 homes, plus
new construction each year. The survey started in 1973, and has had the same sample since 1985, enabling researchers and
practitioners to letting you monitor housing and household change over time. In some metropolitan areas, additional samples
are conducted every 4-6 years, to measure local conditions. 
16 Consistent with the methodology used by the Boston Redevelopment Authority and the Department of Neighborhood
Development, the Housing Report Card treats the production of four student beds as the equivalent of one apartment unit.
17 The 5,014 total new units referenced here includes all units in mixed income developments that qualify for inclusion on the
SHI. It does not include market rate units in market rate developments that may have generated affordable units under inclu-
sionary programs. In such cases only the affordable units are included, consistent with SHI reporting guidelines. The goal
here is to identify the total amount of housing created that would not have been created but for affordable programs, typically
40B.
18 Comparable figures aggregated at the metro level are not available, but a metro area ranking would show a similar pattern,
with Boston ranking in the top 5-10 percent of metro areas by most cost indicators, for renters as well as homeowners.
19 This will probably be the last year the Report Card uses this data source. The Internet has radically altered the way rental
properties are marketed. As a result, fewer landlords are advertising in the print media, resulting in a much smaller and less
reliable sample size.
20 Boston-Cambridge-Quincy MA-NH HMFA
21 As Table 4.1 illustrated, Massachusetts renters—and homeowners—rank ninth in terms of “rent burden” among the 50
states, the higher incomes enjoyed by many Bay State residents partially offsetting the higher housing costs. 
22 Suffolk, Plymouth, Middlesex, Norfolk, and Essex Counties
23 The national delinquency survey is conducted quarterly by the Mortgage Bankers Association. It is voluntary and has
about 150 participating responders. It is estimated that the survey covers approximately 80 percent of all outstanding mort-
gages and is the industry standard for tracking loan delinquencies.
24 Dr. Campen’s most recent reports include Changing Patterns XIII: Mortgage Lending to Traditionally Underserved 
Borrowers and Neighborhoods in Greater Boston 1990-2005 and High Cost Mortgage Lending in Boston, Greater Boston and 
Massachusetts, 2005. 
25 Dr. Campen has noted that many borrowers who receive subprime loans in fact have credit histories and other risk charac-
teristics that qualify them for prime loans; he cites estimates by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac that one-third, or more, of all
subprime loans are made to such borrowers. See www.masscommunityandbanking.org/PDFs/BorrowingTrouble7.pdf for a
more detailed description of subprime loans and lenders.
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26 Data were available for communities within the Metropolitan Area Planning Council region.
27 Statistics on foreclosures in Boston are from the Department of Neighborhood Development’s Foreclosure Trends 2006.
28 In homeownership developments, only the affordable units count.
29 Includes units created through the substantial renovation of existing, substandard properties as well as units gained
through new construction and the adaptive reuse of previously non-residential structures.
30 The 2005-2006 Report Card detailed the increasing role 40B has played in recent years in stimulating both affordable and
market rate housing production, and that history will not be repeated here. Additional information on 40B can be found in
Update on 40B, a March 2007 report by Bonnie Heudorfer, available at http://www.chapa.org/pdf/40BUpdate2007.pdf. 
31 All development, including 40Bs, must comply with the state Wetlands Protection Act and Title 5 septic system regulations,
which are administered locally by the Conservation Commission and Board of Health. If there are septic and wetlands
concerns, as is often the case in suburban and rural communities, separate approvals may be required from these boards. For
larger developments with private sewage treatment facilities, the state Department of Environmental Protection is the permit-
ting entity.
32 The Leading the Way II Pre-Completion Report is available at http://www.ci.boston.ma.us/dnd/pdfs/LTW_II_Pre-Comple-
tion_Report.pdf. The report documents that over the full four year period covered by the initiative 307 units were created for
households earning less than 30 percent of area median income (AMI); 728 were created for those earning between 30-60
percent; 602 for those between 60-80 percent; and 475 for those earning between 80-120 percent. The 475 middle income units
(80-120 percent AMI) and another 234 units serving households below 80 percent of AMI—a total of 709 units—were created
as the result of the City’s Inclusionary Zoning policy.
33 The Community Preservation Act and Affordable Housing in Massachusetts: Learning from the First Five Years, Ann Dillemuth for
the Massachusetts Housing Partnership, August 2006. Includes allocations through June 2006 (includes 2006 Annual Town
Meetings for most towns). 
34 Descriptions of these and other programs can be found at www.mass.gov/dhcd/main/factsheet/default.htm
35 These 10-year tax credits are sold for approximately $.90 on the dollar to private investors. The value of the tax credit is
calculated by multiplying the tax credit award by ten years and multiplied again by the market rate of $.90.
36 The term EUR is used here to refer to projects where the owners may prepay their mortgage or pay it off at maturity as well
as those whose owners may opt out of their Section 8 rent subsidy contracts when they expire. The end result is the same: the
property’s continued use as low-income housing may be at risk.
37 Information on expiring use properties was obtained from the June 2005 CHAPA publication Smart Preservation: Preserving
At-Risk Subsidized Housing with State Bond Funds and the June 2007 Report of the Expiring Use Working Group, prepared for the
Joint Committee on Housing of the Massachusetts Legislature.
38 Includes Section 202 Elderly Developments that were refinanced by MassHousing
39 A Study of Appropriate Operating Costs for State-Funded Public Housing in Massachusetts, September 2005
40 Over 80 percent of HUD spending in Massachusetts goes directly to 130 local housing authorities for their Housing Choice
Voucher (Section 8) programs, or to landlords participating in those programs; to the 35 Entitlement Communities that receive
Community Development Block grants and HOME funds directly from HUD; to housing authorities with federally funded
public housing units for their operation and modernization; and to localities, nonprofits, and private owners for homeless
assistance, interest subsidies, and other programs. 
72 U n d e r s t a n d i n g  B o s t o n
41 Excludes MassHousing’s single family mortgage programs.
42 Included in the 2008 funding is a $20 million commitment by MassHousing to the Affordable Housing Trust Fund (the first
half of a 2-year $40 million commitment, and a $1.5 million commitment by the Massachusetts Housing Partnership to the Soft
Second Mortgage Program. MassHousing’s total commitment was $40 million over two years.
43 The 40R districts in Brockton, Grafton, Lawrence, North Andover, Plymouth, Kingston, Lynnfield, and Natick are awaiting
final approval from DHCD.
44 Those projects that have moved into construction—in Chelsea, Norwood, Haverhill, and North Reading—had received
approvals under as-of-right zoning, special permit, or 40B prior to gaining approval as 40R. Similarly, many of the pipeline
projects had been reviewed, and in some cases approved, as 40Bs when the municipality and developer both determined that
substantial benefits could be derived by going the 40R route.
45 The MAPC population projections encompass 164 municipalities, including all of the original 161Housing Report Card
communities except Berkley and Townsend. Also included in the MAPC area are Attleboro, North Attleborough, Northbor-
ough, Northbridge, Uxbridge, which were not among the 161 Greater Boston municipalities. 
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